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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV08-2272

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' JAKE AND
AUDREY SWEET'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANTS' VANCE'S
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, husband and
wife, by and through their attorney, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore & Dokken,
PLLC, and hereby submit this Reply to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply
Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Vance's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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I. BACKGROUND
Please see Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
and Plaintiffs Verified Complaint to Enjoin Defendants From Obstructing Easement,
Attached as Exhibits 1 & 2.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Idaho R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The moving
party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. In opposing a motion for summary
judgment, however, the non.moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or ... otherwise .
. . , must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R.
Civ. P. Rule 56(e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. "A mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho
86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). Further, "[c]reating only a slight doubt as to the facts
will not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment will be granted
whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict would be
warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake River

Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (1984). To be
considered by the court, the evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a motion
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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for summary judgment must be admissible. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979
P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
1.

THE HOCHS WERE GRANTED AN EXPRESS EASEMENT FOR
ACCESS OVER THE UPPER ROAD IN THEIR WARRANTY DEED.

In their responses to Hochs' motion for summary judgment, the V ances and

Sweets raise several arguments. Initially, they argue the term "roadway" contained in the
deeds conveying the parcels to the V ances and Sweets is ambiguous. In addition, they
make several assertions purporting to establish that genuine issues of material fact exist
that preclude summary judgment. Specifically, they argue there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to: the existence of the upper road at the time of the conveyances, the
character of the easement as appurtenant or in gross, what constitutes the dominant estate,
and whether the Vance and Sweet deeds created two separate easements. For the
following reasons, the defendants' arguments as to the express easement are
.

unpersuas1 ve.

a.

1

The Use of the Term "Roadway" Does not Render the Easement
Ambiguous and, Therefore, Extrinsic Evidence is Inadmissible.

The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the Hochs provided the 20 acre parcel
was being conveyed:

1

The Hochs concede, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to their claims for an
easement implied from prior use and by necessity. Although the Hochs still maintain an easement exists on
those theories, they acknowledge the defendants have raised factual issues that must be decided before the
Court may render judgment in favor of the Hochs based upon those theories.
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Subject to and together with the rights and responsibilities set forth in the
following easements:

Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as
Instrument No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the
Vances]
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as
Instrument No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the
Sweets]
(Pls. Verified CompL 4-5.) The referenced deeds to the Sweets and Vances provide:
Reserving unto the grantor, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress
and egress running from public right of way to the above described
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property
herein being conveyed.
Exhibits 3 & 4. The Sweets argue the term roadway as used in the conveyances is

ambiguous because it "is unclear whether the term . . . would include an unimproved
route" or was referencing only those roads "actually in use at the time of the execution of
the deed." (Sweet's Response 8.).

The Sweets' argument is unconvincing. The deeds do not impose any conditions
on what constitutes a roadway. Had the deeds been designed to only reserve an easement
over improved roads or roads currently in use they would have indicated as much.
Because the deeds do not limit the easement to improved roads or roads currently in use,
they should not be construed in such a limited manner. The imposition of restrictions on
an easement by a court is only permissible in regards to the use or scope of an

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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easement. See Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706, 712 (Ct.
App. 1992) (permitting court to impose restrictions not contained in the easement with
respect to the purposes for which the easement could be used). Imposing restrictions on
the scope of an easement is permissible since the dominant estate owner may only use the
easement in a manner that is consistent with the servient estate owner's enjoyment of the
property. Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246, 270 P.2d 825, 827 (1954) ('"When the right
of way is not bounded in the grant, the law bounds it by the line of reasonable
enjoyment.' This means 'that the easement must be a convenient and suitable way and
'

must not umeasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of the servient estate.'"
(quoting Ingelson v. Olson, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (Minn. 1937))); Backman v. Lawrence,
147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d
948, 951 (1976). The Sweets have cited no authority that authorizes courts to limit the
grant of easement itself. As such, the Court should reject the Sweets' attempt negate the
grant of easement contained in the deeds.

Moreover, the phrase "all roadways" is not ambiguous and included the upper
road. Neither defendant has presented a valid argument in support of the proposition that
the term "roadway" would not include the upper road. Black's Law Dictionary defines a
"road" as "a strip of land appropriated and used for purposes of travel and
communication between different places." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). The
undisputed evidence indicates the upper road satisfies this definition as it was a strip of
land used for purposes of travel over the 90 acre parcel. Both defendants admit that the
upper road could be used for purposes of travel at the time they purchased their property.
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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They simply assert that the road was not traversable by car. As discussed above,
however, that fact is not determinative. Nothing in the reservation of easement limits the
reservation to roadways in pristine condition, improved roads, paved roads, graveled
roads, or those traversable by two wheel drive vehicles. Instead, the reservation created
an access easement for traveling over the Sweets' and Vances' properties. By Sweet's
own admission, the upper road was capable of being traveled

one just had to drive

"carefully between the trees." (Aff. of Jake Sweet 2.)

In addition, the Sweets argue that the term "all roadways presently existing on the
property" is ambiguous because it "does not specify the locations or dimensions of the
roads." (Sweet Response 7.) The only case the Sweets cite for the proposition that an
easement is ambiguous unless its dimensions are described with particularity in the
conveyance is from Wyoming and, thus, is not controlling on this Court. In any event,
the decision does not stand for the proposition the Sweets rely upon it for. Rather than
addressing the existence of an easement itself, the decision pertains to ambiguities in an
easement description. See R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586
(Wyo. 1999). The existence and description of an easement are two separate and distinct
issues. 81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) (indicating that the extent, scope, or
dimensions of an easement are issues separate and apart from the existence of the
easement itself); Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 524, 817 P.2d 188, 190 (Ct. App.
1991) ("We uphold the Bethels' right to an easement but remand for entry of an amended
judgment fixing and describing the location of the easement."); see also Quinn, 75 Idaho
at 246-47, 270 P.2d at 826 ("[W]here a conveyance of a right of way does not definitely
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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fix its location, the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way
within the limits of the grant."). The lack of a precise description does not establish a
genuine issue of fact as to whether a road actually existed or whether the Roch's were
granted an easement.

At this point, the Hochs are only requesting summary judgment on the issue of the
existence of the easement itself. They are not seeking a ruling on the precise dimensions
and location of the road. The Court can later issue a judgment specifying the scope of the
easement. See Harvvood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 678, 39 P.3d 612, 618 (2001)
(upholding district court's grant of partial summary judgment on issue of whether an
express easement existed and subsequent bench trial on the issue of the scope of the
easement). Accordingly, the Sweets' attempt to utilize the lack of a precise description of
the dimensions of the easement to challenge the grant of easement itself must fail.

The Vances also argue that the reservation of an easement over "all roadways
presently existing" is ambiguous. They contend that the reservation arguably only
pertained to the lower road since that is the only road specifically mentioned in all of the
deeds. In making their argument, the Vances rely on Cridlebaugh's deposition testimony
indicating that he did not intend to grant the Hochs an easement over the upper road.

The Court should reject the Vances' proffered interpretation of the deeds.
Although the circumstances surrounding the grant of an easement may sometimes be
considered in construing the instrument, such evidence may only be relied upon when the
language of the instrument is ambiguous. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404, 195
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDAi~TS' SWEETS'
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P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008). Here, the language in the deeds to the Vances and Sweets is not
ambiguous.

Both the Sweet and Vance deeds reserve an easement "across

all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed." Exhibits 3 & 4.
By using the plural term "roadways" it is clear the instruments were not intended to
reserve an easement over a single road. It would be unreasonable to conclude that use of
the plural "roadways" in the reservations was intended to reserve an easement over a
single road. The deeds are therefore unambiguous in this regard and extrinsic evidence
may not be relied upon to contradict their plain language. Cridlebaugh' s deposition
testimony attempting to directly contradict the terms of the deed is inadrnissible.2

Nothing about the language in the reservation or grant of easement over the upper
road is ambiguous. Because the upper road was in existence at the time the parcels were
subdivided, Cridlebaugh reserved an easement over the road by virtue of the deeds to the
Sweets and Vances. Cridlebaugh conveyed that easement to the Hochs by referencing
the easement in their deed.

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, in making their various arguments, both parties
maintain Cridlebaugh's intent and other extrinsic evidence should be considered in
determining whether the Hochs were granted an easement over the upper road. Although
the court's primary goal in interpreting a deed of conveyance is to give effect to the
parties' intent, such intent may be settled as a matter of law based upon the plain
2

In any event, Cridlebaugh' s deposition testimony indicates he intended to reserve himself an easement
over the upper road. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 49.) The only question his testimony raised pertained to granting
such an easement to the Hochs. As discussed below, however, because the easement was appurtenant, it is
attached to the Hochs' property.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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language of the document when the language is unambiguous. Porter, 146 Idaho at 404,
195 P.3d at 1217. The parties' intent only becomes a question of fact when the language
in the deed is ambiguous. Id. Language will be regarded as ambiguous when it is subject
to reasonable conflicting interpretations. Id. When language is ambiguous, the trier of
fact must determine the parties' intent based upon the language of the conveyance and the
surrounding circumstances. Id.; Bethel, 120 Idaho at 525, 817 P.2d at 191 ("An
instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous ....
When an instrument is ambiguous in nature, the intention of the parties as reflected by all
of the circumstances in existence at the tin1e the easement was given must be considered
in construing the granting instrument.").

Because the deeds in this case are unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not be
utilized by the Court in determining whether the Hochs obtained an easement over the
upper road. Although intent may become relevant when the Court is faced with deciding
the scope and dimensions of the easement since they are not precisely identified in the
instrument, at this point, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. See R. C.R., Inc., 978 P .2d at
586. ("If the terms of description are inadequate or nonexistent, then extrinsic evidence
may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties as to the location and dimensions
of the easement."). Pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the deeds, the Hochs obtained
an express easement over all existing roads on the Sweet and Vance properties. This
necessarily included the µpper road.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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b.

There is No Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to the Existence of
the Upper Road at the Time the Property was Subdivided.

Next, the defendants argue that the Hochs did not obtain an easement over the
upper road because the road was not in existence at the time the 90 acre tract was
subdivided. Alternatively, they argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the road existed. Under this theory, if the upper road did not exist at the time the
property was conveyed to them it was not an "existing roadway" over which Cridlebaugh
retained an easement that he could subsequently grant to the Hochs.

Contrary to the defendants' assertion, there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the existence of the upper road at the time of the conveyances. The evidence
clearly indicates the upper road existed at the time Cridlebaugh began subdividing the
property. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 9, 20.) In fact, the road existed before Cridlebaugh even
purchased the 90 acre tract, although it was admittedly a dirt road. Id. at 19. In reference
to the upper road, Cridlebaugh admitted in his deposition that:

It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from,
well, from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a
loop before I bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a
westerly direction in front of V ances, made a loop out toward the
Hochs' property and then went right back ... out to my ten acres.

Id. He further indicated that the road was an access road, then went on to testify:
Q.
Okay. At the time you sold the property to both Vance and to
Sweet, both the upper and the lower roads were in place; correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And, and Teats had bladed the, both of those roads, correct?

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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A.

Yeah.

Q.

And they were passable, certainly by a pickup truck?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Was it your intention when you first deeded property to Jake

and Audrey Sweet to retain, for yourself anyway, an easement on both the
lower and the upper road?
A. Yes.
Id. at 20, 48-49. Based upon this testimony, it is clear the upper road existed at the time

of all three of the conveyances.

Nonetheless, both defendants attempt to argue the upper road did not exist until
2004. Their own construction of the facts, however, undermines their assertion. In his
affidavit in opposition to the Hochs' motion for summary judgment, Jake Sweet admits,
with respect to the upper road, that "[y]ou could drive a pickup truck carefully between
the trees on what appeared to be ATV trails that were not connected or skidder trails that
had been used when the property had been logged." (Aff. of Jake Sweet 2.) Becky
Vance represents in her affidavit that "it was not possible for a car to access Mr. and
Mrs. Roch's property by the 'upper road'" prior to 2003 or 2004. (Aff. of Becky Vance
2, para. 6) (emphasis added).

Neither the Vances nor the Sweets presented any evidence to indicate the upper
road did not exist at the time of the conveyances. Their reliance on the fact that the upper
road was not traversable by car at the time of the conveyances is misplaced. As

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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discussed above, the term "roadway'' is not limited to improved roads traversable by car.
Both defendants admit (although the Vances' only implicitly) that trucks could utilize the
road. In addition, the Sweets admit that the upper road was accessible before they began
improving it.

Jake Sweet testified in his affidavit that he and his wife "began

to improve access across Weinert and Cridlebaugh' s property to our property by
removing trees and blading a somewhat straight route to our property." (Aff of Jake
Sweet 2) (emphasis added). One cannot improve something that does not already exist.
If the road did not exist until 2004 as the Sweets maintain, they would have had to

construct new access, rather than improve existing access. Further, the Sweets admit that
Cridlebaugh granted them an easement over the upper road in the deed conveying them
the 40 acre parcel. See (Sweets' Response 4) ("The Sweet Deed provides in three
paragraphs the easements at issue here. The first paragraph sets over to Sweet what is
commonly referred to as the 'upper road.'"). Because the Sweets obtained title to the
property in 2001 and the upper road was specifically referenced in their deed, it is
disingenuous for them to argue the road did not exist until 2004. Finally, Cridlebaugh
clearly testified the road existed at the time he purchased the property. (Cridlebaugh
Dep. 20, 48-49.) In light of these facts, it is evident that what the defendants' assertion
essentially comes down to is that the upper road was not in as good of condition at the
time of the conveyances as it is today.

Because it is undisputed that the upper road could be utilized, albeit by truck, at
the time of the conveyances, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its
existence. Although the road may not have been in the best condition before it was
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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improved by the Sweets, it was in existence at the time the properties were conveyed to
the V ances, Sweets, and Hochs. Accordingly, the Hochs have an access easement over
the upper road. The only fact that remains to be determined is the scope of the access
easement granted to the Hochs - not its existence.

c.

No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists With Respect to the
Appurtenant Nature of the Easement.

The defendants argue that, even if Cridlebaugh did reserve an easement over the
upper road, the easement was in gross and, thus, was not transferred to the Hochs by their
deed. In making this argument, the defendants rely on the fact that their deed specifically
indicates that the easement for ingress and egress is appurtenant while the reservation of
an easement over all other existing roadways contains no such reference.

An appurtenant easement establishes a right to use a certain piece of property (the

servient estate) for the benefit of another piece of property (the dominant
estate). Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). The rights
stemming from an appurtenant easement attach to the dominant estate and cannot be
separated from the land. Id. Because such easements are fixed to the real property, they
run with the land and may be claimed by the original easement mvner's successors-ininterest. Id.; LC. § 55-603; see also Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,
301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) ("One who purchases land expressly subject to an
easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing
easement, takes the land subject to the easement." (quoting Checketts v. Thompson, 65
Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944))). In Idaho, easements are presumed to be
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
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appurtenant. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. There is no requirement that
easements be referred to as such for the presumption to arise. If there were, there would
be no need for the presumption. The fact that one easement contained in a deed is
referred to as appurtenant and another is not is insufficient to overcome the
presumption. See 25 Arn. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 10 (2009) ("An easement
may be considered appurtenant if it is so in fact, even though not declared to be so in
deed.").

Contrary to the defendants' assertion, Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant
easement over the upper road. Cridlebaugh' s use of the phrase "appurtenant" to describe
the easements for ingress and egress can best be explained by the fact that those
easements already existed as appurtenances to the property. The easement over "all
roadways presently existing," on the other hand, was not yet an appurtenance to the
property because it was being created by the reservation. As such, it was not referred to
as an appurtenance in the deeds.

The appurtenant nature of the easement over the upper road is further
demonstrated by the language reserving the easement to the "grantor, his heirs and
assigns." Exhibits 3 & 4. The Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that use of the
phrase "heirs and assigns" in a grant or reservation of easement demonstrates that the
easement is appurtenant. See, e.g., Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 375,
723 P.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding presumption of appurtenance was not
overcome where easement was granted to the plaintiff and his "heirs and assigns"
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because the phrase '"generally comprehends all those who take either immediately or
remotely from or under the assignor, whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of
law'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 109 (5th ed. 1979))). In light of these
considerations, it is clear Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement over the upper
road. Because the easement is appurtenant, it was not a personal right belonging to
Cridlebaugh; but instead, remains attached to the dominant estate. As such, by
purchasing the dominant estate, the Hochs obtained the easement regardless of whether it
was specifically mentioned in their deed. See 81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009)
("An appurtenant easement for right of way purposes passes with subsequent

conveyances, even if the specific language of the right of way is not repeated in the
deed.").

d.

Because the Easement Over the Upper the Road is Appurtenant, it
Was Not Necessary that it be Specifically Mentioned in the Hochs'
Deed to be Conveyed.

The V ances argue that Cridlebaugh reserved two separate easements in his grants
to the V ances and Sweets: one for ingress and egress and one over all existing roadways.
According to the V ances, the deed from Cridlebaugh to the Hochs only conveyed the
easement for ingress and egress, which was over the lower road. The V ances maintain
the deed to the Hochs did not convey an easement over other existing roadways and,
therefore, the Hochs do not have an easement over the upper road.

The V ances' argument is unconvmcmg because the easement Cridlebaugh
reserved over all existing roadways was an appurtenant easement that cannot be separated

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' SWEETS'
REPLY MEMORAl\TDUM - Page 15
toc/hoch_}ohnlpleadingslreply_ 00 I

rr,.~•nn

Mnnrf' /1,,

nokken. PLLC

from the real property. As discussed above, in Idaho, when the nature of an easement is
unclear, courts will presume the easement is appurtenant. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230,
76 P.3d at 974. Because appurtenant easements are attached to the land, they need not be
specifically mentioned in a deed to be conveyed with the property. See Bothwell v.
Keefer, 53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 66 (1933) ("And the general rule is that, where
an easement is annexed to land, either by grant or prescription, it passes as an
appurtenance with the conveyance 'of the dominant estate, although not specifically
mentioned' in the deed, or even without the use of the term 'appurtenances,' 'unless
expressly reserved from the operation of the grant.'" (quoting Johnson v. Gustafson, 49
Idaho 376, 288 P. 427, 429 (1930))); Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1,
13, 156 P.3d 502, 514 (2007) (noting that a water right passes "with the property to
which it is appurtenant even though not mentioned in the deed, [based on] analogy from
the law applicable to easements").

Here, there has been no evidence presented to rebut the presumption that the
easement over the upper road was an easement appurtenant. Instead, for the reasons
elaborated above, several facts demonstrate the easement Cridlebaugh reserved over all
existing roadways was appurtenant to the property purchased by the Hochs. Accordingly,
even if the language of reservation in the Sweet and Vance Deeds is construed to create
two distinct easements as the V ances suggest, the Hochs still obtained an access easement
over the upper road when they purchased the property. Because the easement was
appurtenant, the easement over the upper road was included in the conveyance to the
Hochs and they are entitled to summary judgment.
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e.

There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that the Hochs are the
Owners of the Dominant Estate.

Next, the Sweets argue it is unclear whether the Hochs are the owners of the
dominant estate. They maintain that, because their deed is ambiguous as to what property
constitutes the dominant estate, the reference in the Hoch Deed to the Sweet Deed
"perpetuates" the ambiguity.

The Sweets' argument that it is unclear what property is the dominant estate lacks
credibility. The easement, being one of reservation, unmistakably and conclusively
establishes the property retained by the grantor as the dominant estate. Cridlebaugh
originally owned 90 acres of property. Each deed contained a description of the property
being conveyed. There was never any question as to the property Cridlebaugh was
retaining for himself.

Consequently, the dominant estate was never in question.

Accordingly, this theory advanced by the Sweets is not a basis for denying the Hochs'
motion for summary judgment.

3

Cridlebaugh subsequently conveyed the dominant estate

to the Hochs by Warranty Deed. Exhibit 5.

3

In any event, this argument by the Sweets is disingenuous since they admit to the existence of a dominant
and servient estate in their discussion regarding an easement by necessity. See (Sweet's Reply 15)
("Sweet's offer to provide a route which did not permit Roch's travel in front of Sweet's residence is
consistent with the servient property owner's ability to use his property consistent with the easement
granted.").
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2.

THE HOCHS HAVE NOT REQlJESTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED UPON THE THEORY OF A PRESCRIPTNE EASEMENT
AND DO NOT DISPUTE THE SWEETS' ARGUMENT THAT A
PRESCRIPTNE EASEMENT DOES NOT EXIST.

The Hochs do not dispute the Sweets' argument that they do not have an easement
over the upper road based upon a prescriptive easement theory. The Hochs did not rely
on that theory in their motion for summary judgment and do not intend to do so now or in
the future.

3.

THE HOCHS CONCEDE THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE RAISED
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO THEIR
CLAIMS FOR AN EASEMENT IMPLIED BY NECESSITY AND
PRIOR USE.

The Hochs maintain that they are entitled to an easement over the upper road
based upon the theories of easement implied from prior use and easement by necessity.
Because the defendants have raised factual issues relevant to the elements necessary to
prove such easements, however, the Hochs concede they are not entitled to summary
judgment based upon those theories. In the event the Hochs' motion for summary
judgment on their express easement theory is denied, however, the Hochs will seek a trial
on the implied easement theories. At that time, the factual issues of necessity, expense,
prior use, and prejudice may be determined.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Hochs' motion for summary judgment based on the theory of an express
easement should be granted. Because the upper road existed at the time of the first grant
to the V ances in October 2000, the Hochs have an appurtenant access easement over the
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road. Alternatively, should the Court conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to the existence of the road at the time of the conveyance to the V ances, the Hochs
request a grant of partial summary judgment recognizing that, should the trier of fact
determine the upper road did exist, the Hochs have an easement over the road. Judgment
would then be entered in favor of the Hochs once the factual issues regarding the
existence and location of the road were decided.

DATED this 25th day of November, 2009.
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC

~£/~~
beOd~e 0. Creason
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch
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CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O.DraweI835
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516
Fax: (208) 7 46.,2231

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHNM. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV08.,2272

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch (hereinafter "the Hochs"), by
and through their counsel ofrecord, Theodore 0. Creason, of Creason, Moore & Dokken,
PLLC, hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Jack Cridlebaugh was the o-wner of 90 acres of real property in W aha, Idaho.
(Cridlebaugh Dep. 6.) In 2000, Cridlebaugh subdivided the property into four parcels. Id.
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Three of ·the parcels were sold over the course of three years: .Rob and Becky Vance
purchased 20 acres on October 12, 2000, Jake and Audrey Sweet purchased 40 acres on
October 10, 2001, .and John and Carole Hoch purchased .20 acres on March 26, 2002.
Cridlebaugh retained ovmership of the remajning 10 ·acres. (Pls. Verified Comp1. 3-4.)

In conveying the three parcels, Cridlebaugh granted and reserved several easements
over each piece of property. Id. Of particular significance, Cridlebaugh reserved an easement
over Black Bear Bend, also lmown as the upper road, which was used to access the property
eventually sold to the Hochs. 1 The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the V ances,
.Instrument No. 657867, stated:
Reserving unto the grantor, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress running from the public right of way to the above described property.
which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over
and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.
Id. at 3 & Exh. A

The warranty deed conveying property to the Sweets, Instrument No.

668025, contained the same provision. Id. at 4 & Exh. B. Thus, pursuant to the warranty
deeds, Cridlebaugh retained easements over all roads on the 90 acre tract that were in
existence at the tin1e of conveyance. It is undisputed that the upper road used to access the
Hochs' property existed at the :time of conveyance. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 20.)
Wben Cridlebaugh subsequently conveyed the 20 acre parcel to the Hochs, he granted
them an access easement over the upper road. The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the
Hochs provided the.20 acre parcel was being conveyed:

1

The upper road crosses over the northeast portion of the Sweet property and the southwest comer of the
Vance property.
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Subject to and together with the rights and responsibilities set forth in the
follmving easements:
Easement-for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 200 as Instrument No.
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deedto the V ances]
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the Sweets]
(Pls. V eri:fied Comp1. 4.:5.) Based on this language in the warranty deed, the Hochs purchased
the property believing they would be able to access their property by using ·the upper road.
Although there was a lower road that also led to the Hochs' property, the road was not
passable during the winter months and, at all other times, it was only accessib1e in a four
wheel drive vehicle. (CridlebaughDep. 46-47.)
Immediately after purchasing the property, the Hochs began using the upper road for
access. In addition, the road was used to deliver construction materials and equipment to the
property.

The Hochs continued to use and maintain the road from 2002 until November

2007. 2 At that point, after five years of using the road, the Hochs received a letter from the
Sweets indicating that they were terminating the easement over the portion of the upper road
that traversed their property on June 30, 2008. (See Pls. Verified Compl. Exh. D.) According
to the Sweets, the Hochs only had a revocable license to use the upper road while their home
was being constructed. Id. Once construction was completed, the Sweets maintained the
Hochs would only be permitted to use a newly constructed road, lmown as New Hoch Access,
to access their property. 3 In support of their position, the Sweets argued that Cridlebaugh

2

The Hochs maintained the road by gravelling it whenever necessary.
The new road went through both Cridlebaugh' s and the Sweets' properties, then connected to the lower
road and, thus, did not avoid the winter access problems.
3
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never :intended to grant ·the Hochs an easement over the upper road. At his deposition,
however, Cridlebaugh admitted that he retained easements over both the upper and lower
roads when he conveyed the property to the Hochs. Id. at 9, 19,..20,-48, 50.
The Hochs responded to the Sweets' letter and informed them that they :intended to
continue us:ing the upper road for access :in light of their easement over the road. S:ince that
time, however, the Sweets have blocked the Hochs' access to the road on several occasions.
(Pls. Verified Compl 5.) The Sweets have used bulldozers, rock berms, and berms of ice to
restrict the Hochs' access. These actions have deprived the Hochs of access to their property
during the winter months when the lower road is impassable.

In an effort to resolve the easement dispute, the Hochs filed a complaint seeking an
injunction prohibiting the Sweets and Vances from :interfering with their use of the upper road
easement

The V ances :filed a counterclaim asserting a claim for trespass based on the

presence of certain improvements the Hochs made to what turned out to be the Vances'
property. The parties engaged in mediation, during which the Vance's trespass claim was
resolved. The parties were unable to resolve the easement dispute. The Hochs' are now
seeking summary judgment on their claim to enjo:in the defendants from interfering with the
Hochs' access easement.

II. ISSUE
A

Whether the Hochs have an access easement over the upper road.

III.

A

ARGU1\1ENTS AND AUTHORITIES

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
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the moving-partY is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. _56(c);

Baxter, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).

The moving party carries the

burden of proving the absence ofa genuine issue of material fact. Baxter, 13-5 Idaho at
170, 16 P.3d at 267.

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, the

nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that -party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or . . . otherwise . . . , must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for .trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 5 6( e);

Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P .3d at 267. "A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to
create a genuine issue of fact." Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963
(1994). To be considered by the court, the evidence offered in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho
807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).
Once the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element.

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). "Creating only a
slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment

will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict
would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake

River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (1984). If the
'

adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
party. I.R.C.P. 56(e).
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B.

THE HOCHS HAVE AN ACCESS E.ASEMENT OVER THE UPPER
ROAD BASED ON THE TFIEORIES OF EXPRESS EASEMENT,
EASEMENT IMPLIBD BY NECCESSITY, AND EASEMENT
IMPLIBD FROM PRIOR USE.

An easement is an interest in real property that gives the easement owner "the
right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the
general use of the property by the owner." Baclanan v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394,
210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976).
Easements may be created in one of three ways: by express agreement, implication, or
prescription. Shultz, 97 Idaho at 773, 554 P.2d at 951. Easements exist in two general
forms: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,
230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). An appurtenant easement establishes a right to use a
certain piece of property (the servient estate) for the benefit of another piece of property
(the dominant estate). Id. The rights stemming from an appurtenant easement attach to
the dominant estate and cannot be separated from the land. Id. Because such easements
are fixed to the real property, they run with the land and may be claimed by the original
easement owner's successors-in-interest. Id.; I.C. § 55-603; Akers v. D.L. White Constr.,
Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) ("One who purchases land expressly

subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an
existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement." (quoting Checketts v.
Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944))). An easement in gross, on the

other hand, exists independent of an interest in land. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d
at 974. Such easements benefit the easement owner personally and do not attach to a
particular piece of property. Id. In Idaho, when the nature of an easement is unclear,
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC
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courts will presume the easement is appurtenant.

Id.

Here, the Hochs have an

appurtenant easement over the access road under the rules regarding both express
easements and easements by implication.
1.

The Warranty Deed Conveying the Property to the Hochs Granted Them
an express easement over the upper road for purposes of accessing their
property.

Express easements may be created by exception or reservation. Akers, 142 Idaho
at 301, 127 P.3d at204. An easement by reservation occurs when the grantor reserves to
himself "some new right in the property being conveyed." Id. An easement by exception
is created when the grantor "withhold[s] title to a portion of the conveyed property." Id.
Either type of express easement may be created by deed. Lawrence, 143 Idaho at 714,
152 P.3d at 586.
Under the statute of frauds, to create an easement by express agreement, there
must be a writing reflecting the parties' agreement. Shultz, 97 Idaho at 773, 554 P.2d at
951; Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 541, 681 P.2d 1010, 1016
(Ct. App. 1984); see also LC. §§ 9-505 & 9-503. "No particular forms or words of art are
necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear
their intention to establish a servitude." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho
710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007) (quoting Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489,
129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006)). An attempted grant of an easement that fails to comply
with the writing requirement is unenforceable in courts of law and equity.

Weaver,

106 Idaho at 541, 681 P.2d at 1016.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'

PL Mf*T~~QS~~~..GMENT ..:--1'ai;e 7
fcibhJcti;J1bfn 1eddtligf1lrtnlmary'fadg!&hi_lff~Je' AN. l 'S
SWEET:s'
PLY MEMORANDUM

Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

In determining whether an express easement was created, courts seekto carry out

the intent of the parties. Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-97, 827 P.2d
706, 709-10 (Ct. App. 1992). When the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous,
the court need not look beyond the four comers of the document to determine the parties'
intent.

Id. at 697, 827 P.2d at 710.

Under such circumstances, parol evidence is

· inadmissible to prove the parties' intent or to contradict the terms of the written
agreement. Id.; Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007) ("Under
the parol evidence rule, when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties
intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or
contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the same subject matter
is not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract.");
McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 111, 190 P.3d 925, 930 (Ct. App. 2008). Only

when the language of a deed is ambiguous may the parties' intent be determined from
extrinsic evidence. Firkins, 121 Idaho at 697, 827 P.2d at 710.
The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the Hochs conveyed an express easement
over the upper road. In conveying the parcels to the Sweets and Vances, Cridlebaugh clearly
reserved to himself easements over all roadways existing on the properties. Both deeds
specifically reserved to the grantor "an easement over and across all roadways presently
existing on the property herein being conveyed." Cridlebaugh testified that the upper road
existed on the property when he purchased it in 1999 and remained in existence when the
property was later conveyed.

As such, the upper road was included in the easement

reservation made in the deeds to the Vances and Sweets. The easement over the upper road is
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one that runs vvith the land since it was created for the benefit ofCridlebaugh's remailling
property. Cridlebaugh reserved the easement so he could have access to the remaining 30
acres of his property - the 10 acres he kept for himself and the 20 acres he subsequently
conveyed to the Hochs. Because the reserved easement is appurtenant, it was included :in the
conveyance of the 20 acre parcel to the Hochs. It was not even necessary that the easement be
specifically mentioned in the Hochs' deed. The fact that the easement was included in the
deed, however, further supports the conclusion that the Hochs have an easement over the
upper road.
The neighbors' position that Cridlebaugh did not convey an ea5ement over the upper
road to the Hochs is unpersuasive. The Hochs' deed specifically :indicates that, in addition to
the property being conveyed, Cridlebaugh was conveying an appurtenant "[e]asement for the
purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as reserved in [the deeds to the
Vances and Sweets]." Those deeds reserved easements over all existing roadways, including
the upper road. As such, the language of the deed makes clear that the Hochs acquired an
easement over the upper road when they purchased their property from Cridlebaugh. Because
the language of the deed is unambiguous in this regard, parol evidence may not be used to
contradict the terms of the conveyance. Any subsequent assertions by Cridlebaugh that he did
not intend to grant the Hochs an easement over the upper road are therefore irrelevant and
inadmissible.
2.

In the event the Court concludes the Hochs were not granted an express
easement the Hochs have an easement· implied by necessity over the
upper road.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'

PL~~m~Nf1A1Nfsige
SWEET~' REPLYMEMORANDUM

9

Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231

,:

.-: ~

Idaho law Tecognizes .two categories of implied easements: easements implied by
necessity and easements implied from prior use. Baclanan v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,
394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681
P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements are implied by reason of necessity "because
the parties at the time of severance presumably recognized the need for access" and the
conveyance of property must include "whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that
property." MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1118, 739 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App.
1987). Three elements must be satisfied to "establish an easement by necessity: (1) unity
of ownership prior to division of a tract; (2) necessity for an easement at the time of
severance; and (3) great present necessity.''4 Id. Whether an easement by necessity
exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. Once the three elements are
satisfied, an easement by necessity will be held to exist, regardless of any contrary intent
held by one of the parties. Id. at 1119, 739 P.2d at 418. The easement will continue as
long as the necessity exists unless the easement is terminated by express agreement. Id.

iill easement by necessity will not be recognized where the benefits of the easement are

4

This last element has been reformulated to require only reasonable necessity, however, courts still use the
term "great necessity" in describing the required elements. See Backman, 147 Idaho at 394, 210 P .3d at 79;
MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1120 n.3, 739 P.2d at 419 n.3. But see Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v.
Han-ison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 P .3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (noting that to establish reasonable necessity in
the context of easements implied from prior use, a claimant's burden is less than that required to show great
present necessity in the context of easements implied by necessity). Idaho case law has not seemed to
recognize or address the contradicting characterizations. The distinction likely lies, however, in whether
the implied easement will benefit the grantor or the grantee. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851,
854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("It appears to be the position ofa majority of jurisdictions that an implied grant
of an easement requires only a showing of reasonable necessity, while an implied reservation of an
easement in the grantor requires a showing of strict necessity."). Regardless of which standard the court
chooses to apply, however, for the reasons discussed below, the Hochs have met their burden of proving
necessity.
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outlveighed by the damage or inconvenience that may result to the owner of the servient
estate. Id. at 1120, 739 P.2d at419.
To satisfy the necessity element of an easement implied by necessity, the plaintiff
need only show there is a reasonable necessity for the easement. MacCaskill, 112 Idaho
at 1120 n.3, 739 P.2d at 419 n.3. Reasonable necessity does not require that existing
routes be "absolutely impossible to use," however, it is not enough to show that the
existing route is simply inconvenient or expensive. Id. at 1120, 739 P.2d at 419; Weaver,
106 Idaho at 542, 681 P.2d at 1017. Accordingly, reasonable necessity does not exist
where access can be made practical at a reasonable expense. MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at
1120, 739 P .2d at 419. Where "the difficulty or expense of using the legally available
route is so great that it renders the parcel unfit for its reasonably anticipated use," the
reasonable necessity element will be satisfied. Id.
Necessity for an easement may exist based on either physical or legal obstacles.
Id.

Thus, "topographical characteristics of the land [that] make the legal access

impassable" may justify an easement by necessity. Id.; see also 11 Alvl:. JUR. Proof of
Facts 3d 601 (2009). Examples of topographical obstacles include mountainous, rocky

areas, steep canyons, cliffs, flooding rivers, and low wetlands. 11 AM:. JUR. Proof of
Facts 3d 601 (2009); MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1119-20, 739 P.2d at 418-19 (recognizmg

an easement by necessity may exist where access to one portion of property is adequate
but another portion of the property is isolated by topographical features). Topographical
barriers may justify an easement by necessity even when the barriers are only seasonal.
See Liles v. Wedding, 733 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding easement by

Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC
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necessity had been established when Claimants alternative means of access was
untraversable half of the time because of flooding); Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189,
192 (Vt. 2006) (concluding easement implied by necessity existed over road wben the
plaintiff would otherwise be left without consistent practical means of accessing the
property because other access did not exist during the winter); Bochi v. Shaffer, 1999 WL
33438818, *.2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing an easement implied by necessity
may exist during the periods when the primary access road is impassable) (unreported);
cf Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 82, 665 P.2d 1081, 1092 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding no

easement by necessity existed where claimed easement access and alternative access
were both unavailable during the winter months).

In the event the court concludes the Hochs did not obtain an express easement,
they have an easement over the upper road based on the theory of easement implied by
necessity. First, there was unity of ownership of the dominant estate (now owned by the
Hochs) and the servient estates (now owned by the Sweets, Vances, and Cridlebaugh).
Each parcel was owned by Cridlebaugh prior to the subdivision of the 90 acre tract.
Second, there was a necessity for the easement at the time of severance because, without
the easement, the Hochs property was inaccessible during the winter months and only
accessible by four wheel drive vehicle at other times. Third, topographical features make
an easement over the upper road reasonably necessary. Due to the terrain and heavy
snow that accumulates during the winter months, alternative access to the Hochs'
property is unavailable during the winter. At such times, the Hochs' only access to their
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property is through use of the.upper road. Accordingly, an easement over the upper road
is necessary for the Hochs to put their_property to practical use as their family residence. 5

2.

The Hochs have an easement implied from prior use over the upper road..

An easement implied from prior use exists when the plaintiff establishes there
was: (1) "unity oftitle and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate"; (2)
apparent and continuous use of the easement for "long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show the use was intended to be permanent"; and (3) the easement is
"reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate." Beach Lateral
Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006); Akers v.
Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 45, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2009); Bob Daniels & Sons v.
Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). In determining
whether there is reasonable necessity, courts focus on whether access was necessary at
the time of severance rather than present necessity. Harrison, 142 Idaho at 605, 130 P.3d
at 1143. Thus, unlike easements implied by necessity, easements implied from prior use
are not extinguished once access is no longer reasonably necessary. Id.
The Hochs have an easement implied by prior use over the upper road.

As

discussed above, there was unity of title of the dominant and servient estates before
severance and the easement was reasonably necessary at the time of severance. Thus, the
first and third elements required to establish an· easement implied from prior use are
satisfied. The final element, apparent and continuous use, is also present. Cridlebaugh
testified that the upper road has existed on the property since he purchased the 90 acres in
5

Should the court conclude access to the upper road is only necessary during the winter, an easement
implied by necessity exists on a seasonal basis. See, e.g., Bochi v. Shaffer, 1999 WL 33438818, *2-3
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
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1999 and that he used ·the road to .access the Hoch property during his period of
ownership. By continuing to use the road and reserving an easement over the road in ihe
grants to the Sweets and V ances, it is evident Cridlebaugh intended the easement to be
permanent. Because there is evidence supporting each of the three elements necessary to
prove an easement implied from prior use, the HochB also have an easement over the
upper road based on that theory.

IV.

'CONCLUSION

The Hochs have an easement over the upper road based on each of the following
theories: the grant of an express easement, an easement implied by necessity, and an
easement implied from prior use. As such, summary judgment should be entered in their
favor and their request for an injunction preventing the neighbors from interfering with
the easement should be granted.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2009.
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC

heodore 0. Creason
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch
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·CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of October, .2009, a copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' :MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by the method indicated below and addressed to
the following:
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
P. O.Box32l
322 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH,
Husband and wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY
VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

CV08-'02272
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
TO ENJOIN DEFENDANTS
FROM OBSTRUCTING
EASEMENT

COME NOW JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, husband and wife, and for cause
of action against the defendants, JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, and
~

ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, and allege as follows:
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D
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I.
Plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, that
adjoins defendant Vance's property to the west and defendant Sweet's property to the north, more
particularly described as follows:

The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian,
Official records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

II.
Defendants ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, are the owners of a
tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State ofidaho, that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the east,
more particularly described as follows:

The East Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.

III.
Defendants JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, are the ovm.ers of a
·tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the
south, more particularly described as follows:

The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official
Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
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IV.
Prior to October 12, 2000, all u1ree of the above described properties were owned by JACK
W. CRIDLEBAUGH, the plaintiffs and defendants common gr&.1.tor.

V.

On October 12, 2000, said JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the defendants Vance
the land described in paragraph II above by Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument
No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

VI.
The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Vance reserved, in favor of
Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and egress, including the following:
"TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running
from public right-of-way to the above described real property which
are appurtenances to said real property.
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all
easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to
the above described real property which are appurtenances to said
real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed."

VII.
On October 10, 2001, said JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the defendants Sweet
the land described in paragraph III above by Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as
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Instrument No. 66802.5, records of ]\fez Perce County, Ida..110. A copy of said vVarn:mty Deed is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.

VIII.
The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Sweet reserved, in favor of
Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and egress, including the follmving:
"TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress
and egress over and across existing roads located on the following
described property: The East half of the Northwest Quarter and the
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter, all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West
of the Boise Meridian, the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and
assigns, said easements."
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all
easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to
the above described property which are an appurtenances to said real
property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed."

IX.
On March 26, 2002, said JACK CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the plaintiffs the real
property described in paragraph I above by Warranty Deed recorded March 26, 2002 as Instrument
No. 673441, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto
as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. Said Warranty Deed provided, in part, as
follows:
"SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights
responsibilities set forth in the following easements:

and

5.
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights
incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October
16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
(The deed conveying the property to the defendants Vance.)
6.
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights
incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October
10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho."
(The deed conveying the property to the defendants Sweet.)

x.
On November 17, 2007, the defendants Sweet mailed to the plaintiffs a letter stating that any
easement across their property would be terminated at the latest on June 30, 2008. A copy of said
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference.

XI.
In furtherance of their threat to terminate ingress and egress easement which the plaintiffs
enjoy over the property owned by defendants Sweet, on at least three occasions since June 30, 2008,
the defendants Sweet have blocked access to plaintiffs' property. Most recently, the blockage was
over the weekend ofJuly 12 and 13, 2008 and on July 16, 2008 when the defendants placed a tractor
in the middle of the easement. A photograph depicting the blocking of the easement is attached
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference.
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Since the blockage of the Plaintiff's access to their property by the defendants Sweet in July
of 2008, the Defendant's Vance have caused a survey to be completed of their property. The
preliminary results of said survey, which is not as the date of the filing of this complaint been filed
for record in Nez Perce County, Idaho, indicate that the north-south boundary line dividing the
Plaintiffs property from the Defendants Vance's property has shifted from the location as originally
understood by the parties, to the West. As a result thereof, the Defendants Vance have taken the
position that a portion of the Plaintiff's access road actually lies on their property. The Defendants
Vance have removed the impediments theretofore placed on said access road by the Defendants
Sweet, and have placed an earthen obstacle on said road thereby again cutting Plaintiff access to
their property.

XIII.
Without the use of such access granted to the plaintiffs by Jack Cridlebaugh, the plaintiffs
will not be able to complete the construction of their home on the premises, or after construction of
the home have reasonable year round access to their property.

XIV.
Unless the defendants Sweet and Vance are restrained from blocking the easement, the
plaintiffs will be without reasonable year around access to their property. The plaintiffs will suffer
damages which are impossible to assess at the present time. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at
law and are restricted to this application for injunctive relief.
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Vv'h'EREFORE, piaintiffs request:
1.

That the Court permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants, JAKE SVVEET and

AlJDREY SWEET, husband and wife, from blocking the easement across defendants' Sweet real
property to the plaintiffs' real property.
2.

That the Court permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants, ROB VAi"l\JCE and

BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, from blocking the easement across defendants' Vance real
property to the plaintiffs real property.

3.

That the plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in the

prosecution of this action for the common benefit of the parties hereto pursuant to Idaho Code § 12121.
4.

Granting plaintiffs any other relief, in law or in equity, to which it deems plaintiff to

be entitled.

5.

For costs of suit as prescribed by law;

6.

For such further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

0J

DATED this?-1 day of October, 2008.
JONES, BROVV'ER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

'C])it
~..

--. ,

VER,\;OMPLAINT TO ENJOIN

DE
EA

NWfffi&MsffilJeJr~DANTS'

fliS' REPLY MEMORANDUM

7

.

I

l
/ "
l'
t1 , , ,., . l/
l / >z /v-:_ ?
t-\!J-,.'}
......._

..

"

..<-::<·:::..

STATE OF IDAHO

)
SS.

County of Nez Perce

)

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and
states:
We are the plaintiffs named herein; we have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT
TO ENJOIN DEFENDANTS FROM OBSTRUCTING EASEMENT, know the contents thereof,
and that the allegations therein made are true as I verily believe.

CAROLED.HOCH

~·

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisJ(ll day of October, 2008.

/,Z~

~A,,-'L,

Notary Public ita for the Stafe ofidaho,
Residing at Lewrston therein.
My commission expires
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WARRANTY DEED

For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unman·ied person, as Grantor, does
hereby grarrt, bargain, sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband ru'1d

wi±e, the Grantees, whose cun-ent address is 14400-13 0th A venue N.E., Kirkla.i1d, Washington
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce,
State of Idaho; to-wit
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township
33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property.
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's vvritten
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
owns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYzNWY4) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWY4 SWY4
NE!4) a!! located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.

This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded.
Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
sh.all not exceed one ( l) year;
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C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carTied on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in ai.1y way materially interfere with the guiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel ovmers.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive man11er.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be a.lk1wed to ren:min on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used formofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactmed homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
ovmer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste m::-Ltter
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce suc:.h
tenns.

SlJBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURJ."l\TER ar1d
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho.
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EXHIBIT

-2-

A

·-_.;~

I
~

SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DAJ.E R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband a.rid
wite, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an tmmruTied man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L.
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho."
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER,
husband and \vife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a docwnent granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000 and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this _

day

of October, 2000.

GRANTOR:
--~

I
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce )
On this

/IJ 1'\iay of October, 2000, before me, the m1dersigned, a Notary Public in and for

the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.
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668025
WARRANTY DEED

For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does
hereby grant, bargain. sell and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and
y,:ife. the Grantees, whose current address is I '5'1 L,.-f:r"'54-

d.:..~~~ ui ,qii~flris interest

[n the foI!oYving described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range
4 \Nest of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property, including
but not limited to the easements set forthin that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between
MlKE T. McHARGUE, an unmarried man, as Grantor, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded
September 4, 1987 ~nder Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also kno\:VJ.1 as
EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and
l-«IICHAEL T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHARGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee,
recorded April 3, 1986 tmder Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho,
and that certain Easement by and between John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband
and -.vife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A CASSELL,
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL
N. \VcINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a
single man, recorded under Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
TOGETHER \VITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and
across existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian,
the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements.

RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress rnnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are

appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

PLAINTIFFS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTS'
SWEETS' REPL y MEMORANnuKJ-

A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grai.1tor shall not be required to give as long as he
ovvns any portion of the following described real property:

The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYiNW~) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Qualier (NWY.. SWY..
NEY.i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.
B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shaH NOT be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This_:r.estriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;

c.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the

neighborhood or in any way mate1ially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel own~rs.
D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to pe1manent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constrncted on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on lhe roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall bi; completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the

PLAINTIFFS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTSiSWEETS' REPL y MEMORANDUM
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Oi'mer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper

manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.
K.

.ANIMALS:

No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,

kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
tenns.
REMEDIES.

S OBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and :MIKE McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L.
CLACK, Trnstees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER,
husband and wifo, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public uti1ities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth i11 a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMP ANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said

Gramc:es, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the SJid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all

encumbrances except those set forth .above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2001 and
there.after; and that he \Vili warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
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1N w1TNESS Vv'HEREOF, the said Gr::mtor has hereLmto set his hand and seal this / V day
of October, 2001.

GRA..NTOR:

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce ) .

/J

On this
7?a;of October, 2001, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
the State afida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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WARRANTY DEED
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried perso~ as Grantor, does
hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH aI1d CAROLED. HOCH, husband
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is '!o~

?gtJS'PECTt l.f\D11>.To o 1

7> , all of

{

· his interest in the foUowin'.?: described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho,
to-wit:
The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Tovvnship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridi~ official Records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER VVITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in
the following easements:
. ·-

1)

Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R TURNER and
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and 11IKE McHARGUE,
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County,
. Idaho.
2)
Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759,records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 1
Li

,J.

l·

3)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded, July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760,
records of Nez Per~e County, Idaho.
4)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental ther..dta as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY,
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
5)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. ·

-1-
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6)

Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto

as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:
A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor1s written
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
ovvns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYzNWV..) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWV.. SW~
NE~) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deedis recorded.

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOI be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel owners..

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

-2-
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H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Granter does hereby covenant to and with
·.~,·::;

the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are Iree from all
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this

2-(o, -t4

day of March, 2002.

GRANTOR:

t AcLJJ)
~~·
\

,,

~.1-v._J.g,_~...d
.
I !~
\I

JACK W. CRIDLEBAGH

f

l

1- :
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\

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce )
On this ~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lmovm or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing ii."1.strument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
·

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

7
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November 171 2007

John and Carol
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You certainly must be thrilled to see the building of your dream home
coming into the final stages of assembly, as you approach the day

that you too, get to move in and start enjoying the peace, quiet,
seclusion, and enjoyment of country living here on the mountain.
With winter quickly approaching and the beauty of the changing
season, Audrey S!Jd I were reflecting back on how much we have
enjoyed our past several years living here. Probable like yourselves,
our dream has always·been to live away from all the hustle-bustle of
city living, and enjoy a slower pace of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion,
without allthe noise, interruptions, and traffic associated with city
living. So, with those thoughts still fresh in our minds, we wanted to
again revisit the subject and previous conversations we have had
regarding your use of our road. As you recall, during our initial
discussions on this matter we granted you permission for construction
access across our road and property to assist you and your
contractors in having ready made access to your construction site. I
think you would have to agree, that this construction access across
our road and property has been most helpful in assisting you in a
much timelier and substantially less costly approach to the
construction of your new home! As neighbors we were happy to
assist you in this way, as we too know that at this elevation you have
a considerably shorter construction window than down in town.

While it appears that the majority of the construction of your new
house is nearing completion, we know you still have some work that
will likely be continuing over the next few months. As wintei is quickly
approaching and ground freeze and snow are already making a
PLA§ffi¥'Ji~~<fl the transition into winter, we have decided for the time . ~ 7/1
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being to make no lmmedlate changes to our previous permission for
you to gain construction access to your home by entering and exiting
it across our road and property. As always, we expect you and your
l

contractors to treat the road with respect, maintain a slow and
reasonable speed, watch for our grandchildren and dogs at play, and
promptly assist with maintenance and repairs as needed and
"""~pif"op=ia"'~
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As I stated above, Audrey and my dream has always been to live
away from all the hustle-bustle of city living, and enjoy a slower pace
of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, without all the noise, interruptions,
and traffic associated with city life. Obviously, ;tis no surprise to
either of us that this has not been the case since we. granted you
construction access for the building of your new house. To put it
frankly, the traffic;·not knowing who is coming and going, dust, dogs
always barking at passing cars, and vehicles driving so close to our
home is much more disturbing than we had ever anticipated;
however, it is something that we have agreed to handle for a while
longer and is truly the neighborly thing to do.
As your major construction will be coming to an end in the next month
· or so, we will be into the snowy freezing months of winter when
outside work .is almost impossible. Therefore, we don t feel it
reas·onable at this time fo ask you to start building or using an
alternate access route to your home, rather than the construction
route you have been using across our road and property. However,
you need to start planning now on upgrading your initial and legal
access road to your home, such that any required construction or
upgrade work on it can commence as soon as spring weather allows.
Even with a late spring, there is no reason for you to not have your
own access road to your new home completed by the end of June
2008. This gives you eight months to plan and obtain any needed
permissions, permits, contractors, materials, or any other items that
may be needed for the timely completion of your own road.
Therefore, Audrey and I have agreed that your construction access to
your home across our road and property will terminate as soon as
your road is completed, and under no circumstances later than June
1
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We feel as neighbors we have been very fair and patient in providing
you construction access; however, .as you know, it was never
intended to be anything more than temporary for the purposes of
construction. The removal of all outside traffic going across our
place a!lov.ts us both to get on with our liv~s and pursue our priorities,
Having your own access road to ycmr home elknNs y:ou to monltor
,f'(l?ljr:
,~,j
v~i L,. Y9

t'r';i.p
~.,.,,.,.

.PJ1""1"'~,;;;;;:
~J"'d ~;::;/'.! .1d}\J
~ ....... ~~ ....... ....., ~· L ..~ ~~~kl~ ~'!..J

V.1''ic11ii'
7,.--, . .:;,p"j
if_,__,,,~~ !! ·vg.i.....l,

jJ

For US, no longer having outside traffic across our road and property
allows us to monitor and control the access and security of our road,
property, and dwellings.
I hope you don't find this letter to be a surprise or harsh. as neither
are our intent. W~ are neighbors and we feel we have been and are
continuing to do the right and neighborly thing, otherwise we would
have never agreed to your construction access in the beginning. We
just want to communicate this to you in writing to insure you clearly
understand our position and timeline on the matter of your use of our
roads and for everyone's safety, security, and overall well being that
your use must come to an end in the not to distant future. If you have
any questions or there is any portion of this letter that you don 1t
understand please feel free to give us a call or drop by.
Best Regards,
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WARRANTY DEED

For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmanied person, as Grantor, does

hereby grant, bargain. sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband ar1d

""Yife, the Grantees, whose cunent address is 14400-130th Avenue N.E., Kirkland, Washington
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce,

Staie ofldaho~ to-wit:

The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township
33 North. Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property.

RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress nmning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.
SUBJECT TO the follo-wing Restrictive Covenants:
A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
owns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (E'hNWl/t) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWY4 SWl/t
NEY.t) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.

This Restriction shall tenninate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded.
B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of pennanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;
~
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C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carTied on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet e1lioyment of each of
the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean cmd attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be 111'lowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall noLprohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction eqttipment for the preparation of-b:oilding s:ites or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structm·es.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used forToofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to n1inimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is p.laced on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste mr.tter
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

SlJBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and
CAROLYN I. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho.
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
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SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TUR.~ER, husband a.11d
wife, JAC:<: CRlDLEBAUGH, an tmmruTied man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L.
CLACK. Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Inst-ument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho~
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER,
husband and \vife~ recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COtvn>ANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appmtenances unto the said
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000. and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this_ day

of October, 2000.

GRANTOR:

clc)LRJ
.C~J&b/-JACK W. CRlDLEBAUGH
()
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STATE OF IDA.HO )
: SS

County of Nez Perce )

jtj ~ay

1
On this
of October, 2000, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in ai1d for
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK \V. CRIDLEBAUGH, knovvn or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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EXHIBIT 4

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
SWEETS' REPLY MEMORANDUM

WARRANTY DRED

for Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Granter, does
hereby grunt, bargain, sell and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and
\vife, the Grantees, whose cunent address is I b'I 1.,- et·'s4--

6t.i!. h~

~ ,q~~fl1is interest

in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range
4 1Nest oftii.e Boise Meridian, Official Records ofNez Perce County, Idaho.
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property, including

but not limited to the easements set forth in that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between
i\1IKE T. McHARGUE, an unman-ied man, as Granter, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded
September 4. 1987 under Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also knovvn as

EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and
T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHARGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee,
recorded April 3, 1986 under Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho,
and that certain Easement by and between John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband
and wife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL,
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL
N. \VEINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a
single man, recorded w1der Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
~·ITCHAEL

TOGETHER ·wrTH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and
a.cross existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian,
the Granter reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements.

RESERVING UNTO THE GR.ANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

PLAINTIFFS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTS'
SWEETS' REPL y MEMORANDUMl-
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A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grai--itor shall not be required to give as long as he
owns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EY2NWY.i) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quruter (NW~ SWY.i
NEY..) all located in Section 22, Township 33 N01ih, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This_r.estriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (I) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be earned on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the resirective parcel own~rs.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to pei.manent structilres.

F.

No unpainted conugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constmcted on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on lbe roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall bi: completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the

PLAINTI:FS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'-2SWEETS REPL y MEMORANDUM
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01\>ner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matteJ
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANJMAl.S.: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

SUBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and.
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L.
CLACK, Tnrstees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURN"ER,
husband and wifo, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a docwnent granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said
Gramees, their heirs a11d assigns forever. And the said Granter does hereby covenant to and with
the s.::iid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all

encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 200 l and
thereaf1.er; and that he \vili warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
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IN VV1TNESS \ii/HEREOF, the said Grn.ntor has hereLmto set 1Jis hand and seal this

/vt;·

of October, 2001.

GRANTOR:

JACK W. CR_TDLEBAUGH

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce ) .

flv

//J ~day

.

On this
of October, 2001, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
the State ofida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.
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WARRANTY DEED
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does
hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, husband
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is 'fo!i: ?got;.f>EcT, lf\Pl~To u, { b
'

)

, all

of

his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho,
to-wit:

The West Half of the Northeast Quai-ter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, official Records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in
the following easements:
1)
Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R TURNER and
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and .MIKE McHARGUE,
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County,
.Idaho.
2)
Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759,records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. i .•
J .J

3)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760,
records of Nez Per.:;e County, Idaho.

4)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto· as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY,
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
5)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
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6)

Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rig.lits incidental thereto

as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
OWTIS any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EY.zNWY.) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NW~ SW~
NE1/.i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NQI be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel owners ....

D.

Each parcei shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent ofthis restriction being to miniinize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.
\.

2
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H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter
shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

and

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES.
Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
~?

the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are Iree from all
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN \VITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this

..?::k ti;,

day of March, 2002.

GRANTOR:
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.

STATEOFIDAHO

\

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce )
On this

~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for

the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lrnovvn or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me faat he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day

and year :first above written.

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON[f ~~l~IA\LEJ:JfSTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TE\_E£~N-TlY IDFN~fPERCE

JOHN M. HOCH, et al
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAKE SWEET, et al
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~·
CASE NO. CV 08-2272
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)

)

This case comes before me on the Hochs' motion for summary judgment.
CONTENTIONS
The Hochs, Vances and Sweets acknowledge an easement common to all property
owners and others on what is called the lower road. This dispute is about whether or not
the Hochs have an easement over what is called the upper road that traverses the Sweet
parcel and crosses a corner of the Vance parcel.
The Hochs complain that the Sweets have wrongfully obstructed their access to
their easement over the upper road. The Sweets and the Vances submit they are
entitled to block access because the Hochs do not have an easement over the upper
road. They base their submission on contention that the upper road was not a
"roadway" within the contemplation of the deeds, that the deeds are ambiguous so the
intentions of the parties to the conveyances are relevant to what easements were
conveyed and that in any event the easement created over the upper road by the deed
to the Sweets was personal to Mr. Cridlebaugh and did not run with the land.
ORDER - 1

The Vances also argue the Hoch deed is ambiguous because the preexisting
(Turner) appurtenant easements are referred to by instrument numbers in the Hoch
deed but the easement over the upper road created in the Sweet deed is not referred to
in the Hoch deed by instrument numbers. This, they argue, indicates an intention to
treat the upper road differently, that is, not appurtenant, than the Turner easements,
which are specifically described as appurtenant. The Hochs posit, in response, that
their deed unambiguously and without any material factual dispute conveys an
appurtenant easement over the upper road.
FACTS
Jack Cridlebaugh bought ninety acres of land at Waha in Nez Perce County. He
subdivided the property into several parcels. He sold twenty acres to Rob and Becky
Vance on October 12, 2000, forty acres to Jake and Audrey Sweet on October 10, 2001
and twenty acres to John and Carol Hoch on March 26, 2002. He retained ten acres for
himself.
Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed his interests in the land to the grantees by
warranty deeds. The Vances deed conveyed the east half of the northeast quarter of
the northwest quarter of section 22 and it included the following easement provisions:
TOGETHER WITH all easement for ingress and egress running from public
right-of-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to
said real property.
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs' and assigns, all easements for
ingress and egress running from public property, together with an easement over
and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.
ORDER - 2

The conveyance was also made subject to preexisting easements by referring to them
by their recorded instrument numbers (Turner easements). The parties agree that the
Turner easements are across the lower road.
The Sweet deed conveyed the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of
section 22, together with and subject to ingress and egress easements "across existing
roads located" on described portions of the northwest quarter of section 22. The parties
agree this language creates an easement over the upper road. Mr. Cridlebaugh also
reserved the same easements and subjected the conveyance to the same Turner
easements as he had in the Vance deed.
Mr. Cridlebaug h conveyed to the Hochs "all of his interest" in the west half of the
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 22. The conveyance included the
"rights and responsibilities in the following easements," which included the Turner
easements and "(5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights
incidental thereto as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument
No. 657867[Vance deed], records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, (6) Easement for the
purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty
Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025 [Sweet deed] records of
Nez Perce County, Idaho."
The Sweets and the Vances aver when they bought their parcels that what is
now referred as the upper road did not exist as a road. They conclude, therefore, that it
does not come within the ambit of the "roads" and "roadways" over which Mr.
Cridlebaugh created and reserved easements in their deeds.
Mr. Cridlebaugh testified that when he bought the property there were two
access easements to it from Stagecoach Road, an upper one and a lower one. He
ORDER - 3

--------------------- ,

testified that the upper road was steep and rutted but that he could get a pickup across
it. Once he owned the property he hired Bert Teats to blade both roads to make them
passable by a pickup. He had Mr. Teats fix the roads in 1997 or 1998 so he could log
the property before he sold it. He describes the upper road as follows:
It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from, well,
from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a loop before I
bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a westerly direction in front
of Vances, made a loop out toward the Hochs' property and then went right back
up this way, out to my ten acres. P19 of deposition.
Jake Sweet confirms the upper road existed but that it was impassable much of
the year because it went into a ravine. He later filled the ravine so it was more
amenable to travel. He also says that a portion of the upper road was only passable by
ATVs until he removed a large stump. Prior to the work he did or had done on it, he did
not consider it a road.
Ms. Vance says the upper road ended at the Sweet house until Mr. Sweet
extended it to the Hoch property.
Mr. Cridlebaugh testified that he reserved an easement over the upper road in
the Sweet deed so he could access the property he eventually sold to the Hochs from
the ten acres he retained. At oral argument the parties agreed that that was what he
had done.
Following the conveyance to the Hochs in 2002 they began building a house on
their parcel. With the consent of the Vances, they used the upper road to facilitate the
construction logistics. In November of 2007, the Vances notified the Hochs that
"access to your home across our road and property will terminate a soon as your road
ORDER -
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is completed, and under no circumstances later than June 30, 2008." Since then the
Vances have obstructed access to the Hochs home by way of the upper road. This
action followed.
DISCUSSION
Summary resolution of this dispute is only available in the absence of any material
factual issue. Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698 (1992). The first inquiry, therefore, is
whether the deed to the Hochs is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous a factual inquiry will be
necessary to determine the material issue of what the parties intended.
The Sweets and the Vances argue that the grantor's reservation clause provides
that only the Turner easements that existed over the lower road when the property was
conveyed are appurtenant and the newly created easements "over and across all
roadways presently existing on the property" are personal to Mr. Cridlebaugh and do
not run with the land because he did not describe them as appurtenant. They conclude
that the deeds are therefore ambiguous.
The text of a document is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two reasonable but
conflicting interpretations. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499 (2005); Latham v.
Gamer, 105 Idaho 854, 858 (1983). Whether or not there are reasonable but

conflicting interpretations must be viewed in the context of all the documents in which
the questioned language is found and from that language which the documents have
been incorporated by reference. See, Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508 (2003)
("The intent of the parties is determined by viewing the conveyance instrument as a
whole.").
It is important in real property transactions for all parties to be able to rely on the
written documents without having to guess what was intended. Deeds and agreements
ORDER - 5

are written for the laudable aim of avoiding confusion and having to guess about what
was intended. Cannon v. Perry, 141 Idaho 728, 731 (2007). When construing the
deeds and the nature of the easements, I am obliged to examine the language and the
circumstances leading up to and involving the conveyances. Read, 141 Idaho at 500;
Bums v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1992); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck

& D. Whitman, Property§ 8.1, 8.16, 8.25 (1984); Conrad, Words Which Will Create an
Easement, 6 Mo. L. Rev. 245 (1941).
The documents are deeds conveying multiple parcels from a single piece of
land. The Vance deed grants "all easements for ingress and egress" to the Vances and
reserves to the grantor, "his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and egress"
and grants new easements "across all roadways presently existing." The
circumstances surrounding these real property transactions make it obvious that Mr.
Cridlebaugh is ensuring access over the property he has sold to the property he has yet
to sell or which he may decide to keep.
The Sweet deed conveyed the forty acres that lie between the ten acres Mr.
Cridlebaugh eventually decided to keep and the twenty acre Hoch property, which at
that time he still owned. The parties agree and the deed reflects that Mr. Cridlebaugh
created a specific easement over the upper road across the Sweet property that was
necessary to gain access from his ten acres to the twenty acres the Hoch would buy the
next year. That conclusion is confirmed by the deed's recitation that the purpose of
subjecting the Sweet property to the easement is for "ingress and egress."
Mr. Cridlebaugh then reserved to himself, "his heirs and assigns, all easements
for ingress and egress ... which are appurtenances to said real property, together with
an easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein
ORDER -
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being conveyed."
In summary, Mr. Cridlebaugh created an access easement over the upper road
from his ten acres to the twenty acres the Hochs later bought. He then reserved to
himself, his heirs and assigns all existing easements of which that was one. I conclude
that the upper road easement Mr. Cridlebaugh created and reserved for himself and his
heirs and assigns was conveyed to the Hochs by paragraph (6) where he conveyed the
ingress and egress easement that he had reserved in the Sweet deed.
I find nothing ambiguous about that language. An access easement
between two separate pieces of property is created by the granter over the property
being sold, the grantor then reserves that easement to himself so he can use it and
then he later conveys it by reference to the people who bought the parcel for which the
easement had been created to provide access. This is about us straight forward as
straight forward gets.
It is also noteworthy that if Mr. Cridlebaugh had wanted to exempt the upper road
easement from his deed to the Hochs he could and should have said so because the
Hochs were entitled to rely on what their deed said. Mr. Cridlebaugh not only did not
exempt the upper road easement in the Sweet deed from the Hoch deed, he
specifically conveyed "all of his interest in the" described property. The grant to the
Hochs is "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises unto said Grantees, their heirs
and assigns forever." Here, as was the case in R.C.R. Inc., the deed "contains no
limitations on the transferability of the easement and, in fact, contemplates future
transfers of both the dominant and servient estates." 978 P2d at 586-587.
The Vances argue, nonetheless, that because the Turner easements were
described as appurtenant and referred to by instrument number and the upper road
ORDER - 7
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easement was not so described and not referred to by instrument numbers that the
upper road easement is in gross.
I am unpersuaded. An appurtenant easement does not depend on some
talismanic phrase for its creation. Tower Asset. Sub. Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,
714 (2007). It is created by language that imposes a servitude on a land over which the
easement runs for the purpose enhancing the utility of the land to which goes. "An
easement is appurtenant to land when the easement is created to benefit and does
benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the land." Weber v. Johnston Fuel Lines,

Inc., 519 P2 d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1974)). It cannot be gainsaid that access to one's
property enhances one's ability to use it.
Ambiguity is not created by how one incorporates other documents by reference
but rather by what the language itself says. Even if that were a possible interpretation,
it would not be a reasonable one in light of the presumption against easements in gross
when the language and the nature of the easement lend themselves to an appurtenant
construction. Nelson v. Johnson, 106 Idaho 385, 387-388 (1984) ("In cases of doubt,
the weight of authority holds that the easement should be presumed appurtenant.");

Todd v. Nobach, 118 NW 2d 402, 405 (Mich. 1962); Lynn v. Turpin, 215 8a2d 794, 795796 (Tenn. 1948).
Finally the parties argue the deeds are ambiguous because there is a dispute
about what the terms "roads" and "roadways" mean in the Sweet deed where Mr.
Cridlebaugh created an easement on "existing roads" over the Sweet property to the
twenty acres that Hochs later bought and the easements he reserved "over and across
all roadways presently existing" in the reservation clause.
I find that there is an issue of fact regarding what the parties viewed as a road;
ORDER - 8

that is, whether it had to be passable for a pickup to qualify as a road. There is,
however, no material issue of fact that Mr. Cridlebaugh reserved as easement over
what was referred to by the parties as the upper road. As a result it is not necessary to
determine what Mr. Cridlebaugh meant by phrase, "together with an easement over and
across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed" in the
grantor's reservation clause in the Vance and Sweet deeds, since an appurtenant
easement over what was called the upper road, whether or not it was understood to be
an actual road or an A TV trail, had already been created in the Sweet deed and
conveyed by reference in the Hoch deed.
I conclude the deeds are not ambiguous and there is no material issue of fact to
be resolved and the deeds must therefore be enforced as they unambiguously read.
understand that this result may not be what Mr. Cridlebaugh intended or what the
Sweets and Vances expected. But I do not reach their intentions because the Hochs
were entitled to rely on what they were conveyed in the deed they received.
ORDER
For the reasons stated the Hochs' motion for summary Judgment is GRANTED
as to the existence of an appurtenant easement on the upper road. This order does not
address to the precise route or scope of the easement.

It is so ordered this

~~

day of December 2009.

Otvk,_'-;I·~
_,{~N BRADBURY
District Judge
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1N THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF ID.A.HO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOfIN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and \Vife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,

Defendants.
------·----·-~-

)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOS-2272

)

A MEND COMPLAINT

ORl>.EK GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

The Plaintiffs' Tvfotion to Amend Cornplaint having come before the Court telephonically

on June 10, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., the plaintiffs were represented by one of their· attorneys,
Cynthia L Mosher of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, the defendants Sweet were
represented by their attorney, Edwin L. Littenekcr, and detendants Vance were rcp1escntcd. by
their attorney, W. J crcmy Carr of Clark and Feeney, ::ind the Court having been fully advised in
the premises, hereby makes the fo1lowing order:

ORDER GRANTING PLAlNTl.FFS' MOTION
TO AJVIEND COM.PLAINT - l

3

Pg:

4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs arc granted leave to amend their complaint as
shown by the proposed Amended Complaint arrache<l tu Plaintiffs' Motion to Ai.nend Complaint
dated :tvfoy 3, 2010.

DATED this

j e-1do.v of.Tune, 2010
-·.

~

~~~~~--'
JUDG~

fSl-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF J\TEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV08-2272

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT

COMES NOW the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, by
and through their counsel of record, Theodore 0. Creason, of Creason, Moore, Dokken, &
Geidl, PLLC, and for cause of action against the defendants, allege and complain as follows:

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of

Idaho that adjoins defendant Vance's property to the west and defendant Sweet's property to the
north, more particularly described as follows:

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Tov.rnship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.
2.

Defendants ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, are the o\\'llers

of a tract ofland located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the
east, more particularly described as follows:
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
To\\'llship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
3.

Defendants JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, are the

o\\'llers of a tract ofland located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho that adjoins plaintiffs' property
to the south, more particularly described as follows:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North,
Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
4.

Prior to October 12, 2000, all three of the above described properties were o\\'lled by

JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, the plaintiffs' and defendants' common grantor.
5.

On October 12, 2000, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the defendants Vance the land

described in paragraph 2 above by Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No.
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
6.

The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Vance (hereinafter Vance

Deed) reserved, in favor of Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and
egress, including the followin~:
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public rightof-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real
property.
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RESERVlNG UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.
7.

The Vance Deed also included several restrictive covenants, including the

following:
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each
of the respective parcel owners.
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.
Exhibit A, p. 2.
8.

As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Vance Deed provides that

"[e]ither Granter or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above."
Exhibit A, p. 2.
9.

On October 10, 2001, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the defendants Sweet the land

described in paragraph 3 above by Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001, as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.
10.

The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Sweet (hereinafter Sweet

Deed) reserved, in favor of Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and
egress, including the following:
TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over
and across existing roads located on the following described property: The East
half of the Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
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of the Northeast Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4
West of the Boise Meridian, the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns,
said easements.
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.
11.

The Sweet Deed also included several restrictive covenants, including the

following:
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which rnay be or rnay become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each
of the respective parcel owners.
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.
Exhibit B, p. 2.
12.

As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Sweet Deed provides that "[ eJi ther

Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above." Exhibit B, p. 3.
13.

On March 26, 2002, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the plaintiffs the real property

described in paragraph 1 above by Warranty Deed recorded March 26, 2002 as Instrument No.
673441, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. Said Warranty Deed conveyed the property as
follows:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in
the following easements:
5)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Vance Deed].
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6)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Sweet Deed].
14.

The Warranty Deed Cridlebaugh conveyed to the Hochs (hereinafter Hoch Deed)

also contained the following restrictive covenants:
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each
of the respective parcel owners.
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.
Exhibit C, p. 2.
15.

As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Hoch Deed provides that "[ e]ither

Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above." Exhibit C, p. 3.
16.

On November 17, 2007, the defendants Sweet mailed the plaintiffs a letter stating

that any easement across their property would be terminated at the latest on June 30, 2008. A copy
of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference.
17.

In furtherance of their threat to terminate the ingress and egress easement which the

plaintiffs enjoy over the property owned by the defendants, on several occasions since June 30,
2008, the defendants have blocked access to plaintiffs' property. The most recent blockage was
discovered on February 11, 2010, after the defendants placed a snow bank across the roadway. A
photograph depicting a prior blocking of the easement through the use of a tractor is attached
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference.

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5
toc/hochlpleading/complaint. amended

305

18.

On December 28, 2009, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order

acknowledging the plaintiffs are the owners of a valid easement over Black Bear Bend, or what
has been referred to as the "upper road."
19.

Since the Court issued its Order, the defendants have continued to obstruct the

plaintiffs' access to their property over the upper road.
20.

Without the use of such access granted to the plaintiffs by Cridlebaugh and

recognized by the Court, the plaintiffs will not be able to complete the construction of their home on
the premises or have reasonable year-round access to their property.
21.

Since the defendants began obstructing the plaintiffs' access, the defendants have

also engaged in a continuous pattern of harassing and threatening the plaintiffs and their guests
visiting the property.
22.

In addition to verbal threats and harassing statements, the defendants have

brandished weapons and physically threatened the plaintiffs and their guests.
23.

Defendants have continued to interfere with the plaintiffs' reasonable use and

enjoyment of their property.

Aside from blocking the plaintiffs' easement and otherwise

harassing the plaintiffs, defendants Vance have constructed and maintained an unsightly junk
pile on the property line they share with the plaintiffs.
24.

On several occasions the defendants have also entered onto the plaintiffs'

property without permission. Most recently, on February 11, 2010, Audrey Sweet entered onto
the plaintiffs' property and threatened Mr. Hoch. Mrs. Sweet aggressively approached Mr. Hoch
while waving her arms and papers at him and threatening to cause him physical injury.

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COM:rLAINT - 6
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

25.

Jurisdiction is proper in the district court pursuant to Idaho Code section 1-2210.

26.

Venue is proper in the district court for the Second Judicial District pursuant to

Idaho Code section 5-401.
COUNT I: NUISANCE

27.

Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against

the defendants further allege as follows:
28.

The defendants' actions have interfered with the plaintiffs' reasonable use and

comfortable enjoyment of their property.
29.

The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the

defendants' actions.
30.

The defendants' actions have caused the plaintiffs to suffer damages in the form

of discomfort, distress, inconvenience, and annoyance. Plaintiffs have also suffered damage in
the form of expenses related to the delay in construction caused by the defendants' blocking of
the easement and expenses associated with removing obstacles the defendants placed on the
easement.
31.

Unless the defendants Sweet and Vance are restrained from blocking the easement,

the plaintiffs will be without reasonable year-round access to their property.
32.

The plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the nuisances caused by the defendants in

the form of an injunction, an award of damages, or abatement.
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COUNT II:

33.

TRESPASS

Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against

the defendants further allege as follows:
34.

The defendants have repeatedly entered onto the plaintiffs' property without

permlSSlOn.
35.

The defendants' unauthorized entrance onto the plaintiffs' land has interfered with

the plaintiffs' right to exclusive possession of their property.
36.

The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions

of the defendants.
COUNT III: BREACH OF COVENANT

37.

Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against

the defendants further allege as follows:
38.

The covenants contained in the Sweet and Vance Deeds were intended for the

benefit of the property owned by the plaintiffs.
39.

By maintaining a ju11k pile on the property line shared with the plaintiffs,

defendants Vance have breached the covenant in their warranty deed requiring them to maintain
their property in a clean and attractive manner.
40.

By interfering with the plaintiffs' easement, threatening and harassing the

plaintiffs and their guests, and trespassing onto the plaintiffs' property, the defendants have
violated the covenant in their warranty deeds prohibiting noxious, illegal or offensive activity,
nuisances, or actions that "materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of the respective
parcel owners."

PLAINTIFFS'
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41.

The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions

of the defendants.

COUNT IV: ASSAULT
42.

Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against

the defendants further allege as follows:
43.

By physically threatening the plaintiffs, defendants Sweet intended to put

plaintiffs in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact.
44.

Defendants Sweet's act of aggressively approaching Mr. Hoch while making

physical threats put Mr. Hoch in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.
45.

The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions

of the defendants.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
1.

That the Court enter a judgment defining the location and dimensions of the

plaintiffs' easement;
2.

That the plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

3.

That defendants be permanently enjoined from restricting the plaintiffs' access to

their property through the upper road easement, from interfering with the plaintiffs' reasonable
use and enjoyment of their land, from violating the restrictive covenants, and from further
trespasses onto plaintiffs' property;
4.

That plaintiffs be awarded costs and disbursements necessarily expended m

bringing this action;
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5.

-

--

That plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho

Code sections 12-120 and 12-121; and
6.

That plaintiffs be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may deem

just.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2010.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

flLo~
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of June, 2010, a copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT was served by the method indicated below and
addressed to the following:
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 321
322 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

x

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

W. Jeremy Carr
Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

x

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX T~"l\TSMISSION

tJr--tg,_V~

Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563
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EXHIBIT A
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For Value Received, JACK W. CRlDLEBAUGR, an unmru"Tied person, as Grantor, does
hereby graiit, bargain, sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband a.11d
ivifr, the Grantees, whose current address is 14400-13 Om A venue N .E., Kirkland, Washington
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce,

State of Idaho, to-wit:

The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, To-wnship
33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property.

RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress nmning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.
SUBJECT TO the foliow1ng Restrictive Covenants:
A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
O\vns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EV2NW1!4) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Qumier of the Northeast Quarter (NW!f4 SW!f4
NE~) aU located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.

This Restriction shall tenninate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded.

8.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall ND.I be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of pennanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver

313

shall not exceed one ( 1) year;
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C.

No noxious, iiiegal or offensive activity shall be ca.nied on upor: any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in ariy way materially interfere witl1 the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcel sha11 be kept in a clean and attractive mmmer.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be .allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit th:e temporru·y
use of heavy construction equipment for tbe preparation of building siles or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to niinimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactmed homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

L

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure) resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
ovmer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste mrLtter
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES.

ANIMALS:

Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restnct10ns and

conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
tenns.

SlJBJECT TO Perpetuai Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and
CAROLYN J. TURN'ER, husband and wife, and RA.ND ALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instn.iment No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
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an easen1ent tor a perpet11al r1gn1-or . . vvay ar10 r1g.hts lTiC1denta1 tnereto as set
forth in a document to DA.LE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURlJER, husband arid
wifo, JAG( CPJDLEBAUGH, an unmanied ma11, and TERRY A. CLACK a11d BETTY L.
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Inst.t-ument No. 622759, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho.
l 1.J

SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidenta1 thereto as
set forth in n document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER,
husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities arid rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER C01\1PANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises

v.~th

their appurtenances unto the said

Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the said Grantees that he is the ovmer in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from ail

encwnbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000 and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN \VITNESS WHEREOF, the said Granter has hereunto set his hand and seal this __ day
of October, 2000.

GRANTOR:

cic)LvJ .G;_J&~hJACK W. CRIDLEB~UGH
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce )

iJi~ay

On this /'],,
of October, 2000, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in a11d for
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above VvTi tten.
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for Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmai.1ied person, as Grantor, does

k'

J·ier:::by grnnL bargain, se1l and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY S\iVEET, husband and

\VJ fe, the Grantees, whose cun-ent address is l "5' It....- Er'"' 5.\-

e.J..4~

1.4 ,qiJ~fhis interest

i.n the foilo\ving described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit:
The Southeast Quarter of tl1e Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Tm:vnship 33 North, Range

4 \Vest of rhe Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
TOGETHER WITH alI easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way
to the above described real property which are appmienances to said real property, including
but not limited to the easements set forth in that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between
l\1IKE T. McHARGUE, an unman-ied man, as Grantor, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded
Septernbtr 4, 1987 under Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also known as
EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and
ivIICHAEL T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHA.RGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee,
recorded April 3, 1986 under Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho,
and that certain Easement by and betwee11 John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband
a'1d \.Vife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A CASSELL,
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL
N. \VEINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a
single man, recorded under Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TOGETHER "WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and
across existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian,
the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements.

RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed.
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMJfLAINT

EXHIBIT
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No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's vvritten
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
ovvns any portion of the following described real property:

The East Half of the Northwest Qua.rter (EYiNWY'.i) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (1\T\VY.i SWY'.i
NE:!i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall hlQI be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way mate1ially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive malli'1er.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be a1lowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary

use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to pe1manent structures.
F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shalI be built on Lhe roads or rights-of-way.

I.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall b~ completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
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ow11er shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter
and sha11 cause a11 such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.
K.

No anima1s except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

R EMFDJFS. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

ANJMALS:

SUBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and:
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and 1vITK.E McHARGUE, recorded
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L.
CLACK, Tnistees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities a.11d rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER,
husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e
County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
ser forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said

Gmmc::es, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the s.'.lid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all
encumb1a1ces except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2001 and

thereafter; and that he \'!,'in warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
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IN W1TN..cSS \r\FHEREOF,

~he

said Gn:mtor has hereLmtu set bi:.;

of October, 2001.

~ LL-L ~ .(~·cliu~ L

GRAl'HOR:

JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce ) .

/j ~of

On this
October, 2001, before mi:, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
the State ofida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lmown or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoi11g instrument and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does

hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH and CA.ROLE D. HOCH, husband
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is C[o~

7J?CJe;?EcT1 t,c.'\,!.J\i;"tc u 1 lb , all

of

his i_nterest in the foUowi.115 described premises situate in fae Cou_rity of Nez Perce, State of Idaho,

to-wit:
The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Tovmship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, official Records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in
the following easements:
I)

Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and bet'Ween DA.LE R. TURNER and

CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE,
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
2)
Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document to DA.LE R. TURJ~ER and CAROLYN J. TURN"ER, husband
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 1
J)

3)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TIJRNER and CAROLYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760,
records of Nez Per..:e County, Idaho.
4)
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COivl:PANY,
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
5)
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

-1-
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6)
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rigl1ts incidenta~ thereto
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as fostrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:
A

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he
owns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Qua.'ier (EY:NWY,.) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWYi SWY4
NEYi) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the
Boise Meridian.
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NQI be utilized
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver
shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be canied on upon any parcel, nor
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or in any way materially interiere with the quiet enjoyment of each of
the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcei shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on
the parcel from raw building materials.

-2-
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Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of ar1y structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed with:L.1 one
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the
o\VTier shall cause foe premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter
shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property.

and

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed,
kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES.
Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restnct10ns and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such
terms.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are liee from all
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Granter has hereunto set his hand and seal this ·

2-!0 -ti:,

day of March, 2002.

GRAN TOR:

-3-
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
: SS

County of Nez Perce )

On this ~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Nota.yr Public in and for
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, knoVvn or identified to me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing h'1Strument at1d acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year :first above written.

My commission expires

~-2? ~ 7 C:Vc'.l Y.
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John and Carol

j(

.

You certainly must be thriiied to see the building of your dream home
coming into the final stages of assembly, as you approach the day
that you too, get to move in and start enjoying the peace, quiet,
seclusion, and enjoyment of country living here on the mountain.

With winter quickly approaching and the beauty of the changing
season, Audrey a~d I were reflecting back on how much we have
enjoyed our past several years living here. Probable like yourselves,
our dream has always been to live away from all the hustle-bustle of
city living, and enjoy a slower pace of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion,
without all the noise, interruptions, and traffic associated with city
living. So, with those thoughts still fresh in our minds, we wanted to
again revisit the subject and previous conversations we have had
regarding your use of our road. As you recall during our initial
discussions on this matter we granted you permission for construction
access across our road and property to assist you and your
contractors in having ready made access to your construction site. I
think you would have to agree, that this construction access across
our road and property has been most helpful in assisting you in a
much timelier and substantially iess costly approach to the
construction of your new home! As neighbors we were happy to
assist you in this way, as we too know that at this elevation you have
a considerably shorter construction window than down in town.
1

While it appears that the majority of the construction of your new
house is nearing completion, we know you still have some work that
will likely be continuing over the next few months. As wintei is quickly
approaching and ground freeze and snow are already making a
showing of the transition into winter, we have decided for the time
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT
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you to gain construction access to your home by entering and exiting
it across our road and property. As always, we expect you and your
contractors to treat the road with respect, maintain a slow and
reasonable speed; watch for our grandchildren and dogs at play, and
promptly assist wlth maintenance and repairs as needed and
-

'

}

.:.

~

,

As I stated above, Audrey and my dream has always been to live
away from all the hustle-bustle of city living! and enjoy a slower pace
of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, without all the noise, interruptions,
and traffic associated with city life. ObviousJy, lt is no surprise to
either of us that this has not been the case since we. granted you
construction access for the building of your new house. To put it
frankfy1 the traffic;-not knowing who is coming and going, dust, dogs
always barking at passing cars and vehicles driving so close to our
home is much more disturbing than we had ever anticipated;
however, it is something that we have agreed to handle for a while
longer and is truly the neighborly thing to do.
1

As your major construction will be coming to an end in the next month
· or so, we will be into the snowy freezing months of winter when
outside work is almost impossible. Therefore, we don t feel it
reasonable at this time to ask you to start building or using an
alternate access route to your home, rather than the construction
route you have been using across our road and property. However,
you need to start planning now on upgrading your initial and legal
access road to your home, such that any required construction or
upgrade work on it can commence as soon as spring weather allows.
Even with a late spring, there is no reason for you to not have your
own access road to your new home completed by the end of June
2008. This gives you eight months to plan and obtain any needed
permissions, permits, contractors, materials, or any other items that
may be needed for the timely completion of your own road.
Therefore, Audrey and I have agreed that your construction access to
your home across our road and property will terminate as soon as
3~1
your road is completed, and under no circumstances later than June
1
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We feel as neighbors we have been very fair and patient in providing
you construction access; however .as you know, it was never
intended to be anything more than temporary for the purposes of
construction, The removal of all outside traffic going across our
pl8G8 a!!ov1s us both to get on with our Hves and pursue our priorities.
1

11~.;;;

_f J;..,

;

'

For us, no longer having outside traffic across our road and property
allows us to moni1or and control the access and security of our roadl
property, and dwellings.
I hope you donlt find this letter to be a surprise or harsh) as neither
are our intent. W~ are neighbors and we feel we have been and are
continuing to do ths right and neighborly thing, otherwise we would
have never agreed to your construction access in the beginning. We
just want to communicate this to you in writing to insure you clearly
understand our position and timeline on the matter of your use of our
road, and for everyone's safety, security, and overall well being that
your use must come to an end in the not to distant future. If you have
any questions or there is any portion of this letter that you don't
understand please feel free to give us a call or drop by.

Best Regards/

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPL~T
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1

2
3

4

W. JEREMY CARR
Idaho State Bar No. 6829
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants Vance
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516

5

8

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH a..11d CA.I~DLE D. HOCH,
husband and wife,

9

10

rW:i~5~m

JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

6

7

W JJAL 29 PPl '/- 03

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

11

12
13

JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY
VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

14

CASE NO. CV 08-2272

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS'
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
COUNTERCLAIM

15

16
17

18
19
20

COMES NOW the Defendants, ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, and answers Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint filed in the above-entitled matter as follows:
1.

Defendants deny all allegations contained in the Amended Complaint unless

specifically admitted herein.
2.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 through 16 of the

21
Amended Complaint.
22
23
24

3.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 17 of the Amended

Complaint.

25
26
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM

1

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

33~

II

I
4.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Amended

Complaint.
1

2
3

5.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 through 24 of the

Amended Complaint.

4

6.

Defendants admit paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Amended Complaint.

5

7.

Defendants deny paragraphs 27 through 45 of the Amended Complaint.

6

COUNTERCLAIM

7

As a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, the defendants do complain and allege as follows:
8

I.
9

INTRODUCTION

10

11

This Counterclaim seeks declaratory relief as well as a claim for trespass and attorney fees.

12

The underlying subject matter of this Counterclaim is real property owned by the defendants and

13

adjacent real property owned by the plaintiffs located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho.

14

II.

15

PARTIES
16
1.

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carolee D. Hoch are husband and wife.

18

2.

Defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance are husband and wife.

19

3.

Defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance are the owners of certain real property

17

20

21
22

23
24

situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho more particularly described as follows:
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public rightof-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real
property.

25
26
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM

2

LAW OFFICES OF

33~

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

2

RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being
conveyed.

3

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

4

A.

5

6

The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (El/2NW1/4) and the
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest of the Northeast Quarter
(NW1/4SW1/4NE1/4) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North,
Range 4, West of the Boise Meridian.

7

8

9

This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5)
years after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

10
11

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOT be
utilized as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction
shall not apply during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED
this restriction waiver shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel,
nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to
remain on the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not
prohibit the temporary use of heavy construction equipment for the
preparation of building sites or access roads from the primary right of way
to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing
materials; the intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4)
years of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings
constructed on the parcel from raw buildi:rig materials.

12

13
14

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's
written consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give
as long as he owns any portion of the following described real property:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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1

2

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standings garages, shall be similar
in design to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed
within one year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of
construction, the owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of
debris and waste matter and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to
be disposed of in a proper manner so that the same imposes no interference
or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be
placed, kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to
enforce such terms.

3
4

5

6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

SUBJECT TO Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and
CaroleYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE,
recorded March, 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
SUBJECT TO aneasementforaperpetualright-of-wayincidental thereto as set forth
in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. TURNER, husband ffi1d wife,
JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY
L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997
as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental
thereto as set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760,
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

22

SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental
thereto as set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMP ANY,
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.

23

4.

21

24

Plaintiffs John Hoch and Carole Hoch are the owners of certain real property situate

in the County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho more particularly described as follows:

25

26
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The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian.
1

2
3

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in
the following easements:
1)

Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGlJE,
recorded March, 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

2)

Easement for a perpetual right-of-way incidental thereto as set forth in a
document to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. TURNER, husband and
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust,
recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

3)

Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J.
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No.
622760, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

4)

Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY,
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

5)

Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No.
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

6)

Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No.
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants:

A.

No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's
written consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give
as long as he owns any portion of the following described real property:
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (El/2NW1/4) and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest of the Northeast Quarter (NW1/4SW1/4NE1/4) all

26
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located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the Boise
Meridian.
1

This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5)
years after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded.

2

B.

Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOT be
utilized as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction
shall not apply during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED
this restriction waiver shall not exceed one (1) year;

C.

No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel,
nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners.

D.

Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.

E.

No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to
remain on the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not
prohibit the temporary use of heavy construction equipment for the
preparation of building sites or access roads from the primary right of way
to permanent structures.

F.

No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing
materials; the intent of this restriction being to minimize glare.

G.

All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4)
years of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings
constructed on the parcel from raw building materials.

H.

Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standings garages, shall be similar
in design to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

19

I.

No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way.

20

J.

The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed
within one year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of
construction, the owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of
debris and waste matter and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to
be disposed of in a proper manner so that the same imposes no interference
or detraction to adjoining property.

K.

ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be
placed, kept, bred or maintained on the premises.

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

16

17
18

21
22
23
24

25
26
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L.

REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to
enforce such terms.

1

ill.

2

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

3

4
5

6

5.

Defendants' and Plaintiffs' properties are adjacent to each other and share a common

boundary. The location of this boundary is in dispute.
6.

Defendants and Plaintiffs both purchased their properties from Jack Cridlebaugh.

7

Defendants and both parties were notified at time of sale that no real survey was performed, as noted
8
9

10

in Perpetual Right of Way Easement #622759.

7.

Approximately in the summer of 2005 the Plaintiffs began constructing a home on

11

their property. Defendants discussed with Plaintiffs on many occasions, prior to Plaintiffs starting

12

construction on their property, the need to have a survey done so the Plaintiffs would not build on

13

Defendants' property. Plaintiffs refused to have a survey done and began construction on their home

14

crowding the edge of the Defendants property and in some instances building onto Defendants'

15

property, and excavating and removing trees located on Defendant's property. Plaintiffs actions

16

17
18
19

were without regard to Defendants rights to their property.
8.

Approximately in 2005 the Plaintiffs' and their agents began driving across

Defendants' property without right or permission.

20

21

9.

On or about July 2008 Defendants' had Cuddy & Associates perform a survey on the

22
boundary lines of the parties adjacent property lines. A copy of the survey is marked as Exhibit "A"

23
and incorporated herein by reference.

24
25
26
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10.

On or about August 23, 2008, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a written demand letter

requesting they cease and desist their construction activities on Defendants' property. Plaintiffs
1

2

John and Carole Hoch still refuse to cease and desist their construction activities on Defendants'

3

property. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to remove their property from Defendants' real property

4

despite repeated request by Defendant.

5

IV.

6

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

7

11.

Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations.

12.

At all times mentioned Defendants were, and now are, the owners in fee simple of

8
9

10

11

the aforementioned real estate described above under a deed of conveyance.
13.

As a consequence of the Plaintiffs aforementioned acts, Plaintiffs contest the true

12

location of the boundary line. All of the above named Plaintiffs, known and unknown, claim an

13

interest in the property adverse to Defendant's undivided fee simple interest in said real property.

14

Plaintiffs' claims are without any right whatever and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or

15

interest in or to Defendants' undivided interest in fee simple to said property, or any part thereof.

16
17

14.

The above described claims of the Plaintiffs constitute a cloud on Defendants' title

18

and prevent Defendants from the complete enjoyment and use of said property. As a further

19

consequence of such acts of the Plaintiffs, some of the real property that is owned by Defendants

20

is out of the possession of the Defendants and in possession of the Plaintiffs, to the injury of the

21
22

Defendants.
15.

The Court should declare that the survey line is the boundary line of the parties

23

property and declare Defendants as the owner in fee of the premises in question to the exclusion of
24
25

the Plaintiffs. Further, the Court should issue a permanent injunction enjoining Plaintiffs from

3 f-o

26
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM

8

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501

interfering with Defendants use of the aforementioned property, including but not limited to
enjoining Plaintiffs' from driving across Defendants' property.
1

v.

2

TRESPASS

3

4

16.

Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations.

5

17.

From July 2, 2009, to the present, Plaintiffs and their agents, and employees,

6

knowingly and willfully entered onto Defendants' land, and without legal right and without the

7

Defendants' knowledge or consent, willfully and intentionally engaged in excavation, and engaged
8

in construction activities, including the construction of permanent structures, and causing
9

10
11

12
13
14

construction debris on Defendants' land. Said Plaintiffs converted the removed trees for their own
use.

18.

Plaintiffs and their agents, employees, knowingly built a road across and drove across

the southern portion of Defendants' land without legal right and without Defendants' knowledge or
consent, willfully and intentionally.

15
19.

Plaintiffs, and their agents and employees, knowingly trespassed on Defendants'

16
17
18

property and caused construction debris to accumulate on Defendants' property.
20.

By reason of the above acts, Defendants sustained both general and special damages.

19

VI.

20

BREACH OF RESTRICTNE COVENANTS

21

21.

Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations.

22.

Plaintiffs are in violation of the Restrictive Covenants J and D contained in the

22
23
above-referenced Warranty Deed(s) in that the Plaintiffs have left litter and/or construction debris
24

25
26
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on the property and have caused or allowed construction to accumulate on Defendants' property and
1

2

failed to complete the construction in the allotted time.
23.

By reason of the above acts, Defendants sustained both general and special damages.

3

VI

4

ATTORNEY FEES

5
6

24.

As a further and direct consequence of Plaintiffs' actions, the Defendants have been

required to retain W. Jeremy Carr of the law firm of CLARK and FEENEY, to prosecute this action.

7

Defendants are entitled to recover their costs and fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121
8
9

and Idaho Code§ 6-202.

10

VII.

11

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

12
13

WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully pray for relief and for judgment against the
Plaintiffs as follows:

14
1.

For an order restraining Plaintiffs and their agents, servants, employees, guests,

15
16
17

invitees and others acting under their direction and authority during the pendency ofthis action, and
thereafter permanently, from entering Defendants' premises and from interfering in any way with

18

Defendants' possession, use and enjoyment of the property, or from accessing or driving across

19

their property and from violating the restrictive covenants.

20

21

2.

For damages against the Plaintiffs on all causes of action alleged herein in an amount

to be proven at trial, which amount is expected to well exceed $10,000.00;

22
3.

For an order requiring the Plaintiffs' to remove the items they placed on Defendants'

23
24

property and to restore the property to its natural appearance.

25
26
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4,
1

2

That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendants are the owners in fee of the real

property and that Defendants are in possession and entitled to possession of the real property, and
retain jurisdiction to enforce the decree,

3

5,

For an award ofreasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred in this action,

4

6.

For s~ch oilier and

5

DATED thisd rfrday of

furtliQ;f

6

as 1he Court deems reasonable and just.
, 2010.

CLARK AND FEENEY

7

By!t2~

8

w.~emy~

9

Attorney for Defendants Vance

10
11

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

)

12
13
14
15
16

) SS.

BECKY VANCE, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

'j te

That she is one of the Defendants above named, that she has read the foregoing complaint,
and the contents thereof and the facts
therein are true to the best of her knowledge,
~
information and belief.

v:::.,

17
--':.-.rz..&~~-~~.Lfr~~---------~

BECKYV

18
19

CE

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, this 1J3l!aay of

UUJy

'2010.

\

20

f

21

'} ..

!40

Public in and for the State ofldaho
R'esiding at Lewiston, therein.
My commission expires:-'?;'-"-:"""'7·._l),__-·'""'G_n
l _ _ _ _ _ _ __

22
23
24

25
26
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:-.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

}JJ_1'-aay of~ 2010, I caused to be served a true

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the
following:
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl
1219 Idaho Street
PO Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
PO Box 321
322 Main St.
Lewiston, ID 83501

D

et od indicated below, and addressed to the

D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

D
~
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~

/

/ ~~

10
ll

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 321
322 Main Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 746-0344
Facsimile: (208) 798-8387
ISB No. 2297
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH,
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

v.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

Case No. CV 08-2272

ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM

COME NOW Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet, wife and husband, by and
through their attorney of record, Edwin L. Litteneker and answers the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint and Counterclaims against the Plaintiff's as follows:
1.

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet admit paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
11, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

2.

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet deny paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18
19- 45 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM

1

3f5

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.

SEC01'1]) AFFIR"J\1.ATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any interest in the property of the
Defendants Sweet.

TIDRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs have proceeded in this matter with unclean hands and are not entitled to
the equitable remedy sought herein.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs' have failed to name indispensable parties.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs' claim is :frivolous.
The Defendants Sweets reserve the right to add parties, claims, or defenses based upon
discovery in this matter.

COUNTERCLAIM
As counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet do
complain and allege as follows:
1.

Parties.

1.1

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are husband and wife.

1.2

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are husband and wife.

1.3

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are owners of certain real

property situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly
described as follows:
ANSWER TO
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& COUNTERCLATh1

2

The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez
Perce County, Idaho.
1.4

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are owners of certain real

property situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly
described as follows:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.
2.

Factual Allegations.

2.1

Sweet has constructed at their sole expense a roadway commencing at

Stage Coach Road and proceeding in a Southeasterly direction, then east which
ends at their residence.
2.2

Such roadway was constructed by Sweet's sole expense and provision of

labor, contracted labor and the purchase of materials necessary to build the
roadway.
2.3

Such roadway did not exist prior to Sweet's construction of the roadway.

2.4

Hoch has constructed a residence on the real property owned by them. In

connection with the construction of the home, excavation occurred which resulted
in excess material excavation from Hoch's excavation being deposited on Sweet's
property.
3.

Trepass.

3.1

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing
allegations.

3.2

In approximately July of 2004 without permission from the Sweet's,

ANSWER TO
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3

Hoch, their agents or employees deposited rock on the Sweet's property.
3.3

Such rock remains located on the Sweet property without Sweet's
permission and is a continuing trespass.

3.4

Such rock continues to affect the use of the Sweet property.

3.5

Sweet is damaged by the rock being deposited on Sweet's property by
Hoch.

4.

Unjust Enrichment.
4.1

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing
allegations.

4.2

If such roadway is determined to be real property within which Hoch has
an interest, the real property of sweet was improved to its present
condition without any contribution, participation or expense by Hoch.

4.3

Should Hoch be entitled to use such improvements as constructed by
Sweet, Hoch and Hoch' s real property interest are unjustly enriched by the
actions of Sweet.

4.4

Hoch should compensate Sweet in an amount to be determined by the
Court based upon the expenses, costs, labor and materials incurred by
Sweet to improve the real property interest of Hoch.

3. Attorney Fees. The Defendants, Jake and Audrey Sweet have engaged the services of
the undersigned in the defense and pursuant of this matter and have incurred attorney fees and
costs. Such fees and costs should be paid by the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120,
Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho Code§ 45-612, and LC.§ 6-202.
WHEREFORE Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet pray for relief as follows:
ANSWER TO
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1. That the Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as it relates to the

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet.
2. That the Court deny any injunction or restraint of Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweets'
future actions.
3. That Hoch be required to remove such rock placed on Sweet's property without
permission by Hoch.
4. That Sweet receive damages for Roch's trespass and unjust enrichment as the Court
may determine appropriate.
5. An award of attorney fees and costs to the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet.
6. For other such relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
DATED this

2_ day of August, 2010.
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Nez Perce

)

Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states
as follows:
We are one of the about named defendants named herein. We have read the
foregoing document and know the contents thereof and the fact~ therein are true to
the best of our knowledge.
Q~

-J~~e~w.-<-'ee~t--'~~~~~~~~-

g~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public on this
August, 2010.

5

day of

NOTARY PUBLI in and for the State ofldaho.
Residing at
~~
My Comm. Exp ~ · ~\ · 1-t)\~

fu
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1

3SO

I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing
document was:

___L_ mailed by regular first class mail,
and deposited in the United States
Post Office
_ _ sent by facsimile
_ _ sent by Federal Express, overnight
delivery
hand delivered

To:

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
W. Jeremy Carr
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lev.7iston, ID 83501

on this

l

day of August, 2010.

Edwin L. Litteneker

ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM

7

FILED
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB# 1563
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-1516
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOS-2272
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT
VANCES'COUNTERCLAIM

)
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

For answer to defendant Vances' Counterclaim, the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and
Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, admit, deny, and allege as follows:
RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS IN COUNTERCLAIM
1.

As to the allegations set forth in defendant Vances' Counterclaim, the

plaintiffs deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein.
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT VANCES'
COUNTERCLAIM - 1
toe/ho ch_john/pleadings/answer-sweet

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax (208)746-2231

35~

2.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.

3.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.

4.

Plaintiffs admit that defendants, Rob Vance and Becky Vance, are the

owners of a parcel of real property described as "the East Half of the Northeast Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise
Meridian." The plaintiffs deny that the remaining allegations set forth in paragraph 3
describe the property owned by the defendants Vance.
5.

Plaintiffs admit the allegation set forth in paragraph 4 that the plaintiffs are

the owners of a parcel of real property described as "the West Half of the Northeast Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise
Meridian."

Plaintiffs deny that the foregoing description is a complete and accurate

description of their property. Plaintiffs further deny that the remaining allegations set forth
in paragraph 4 describe the property owned by the plaintiffs.
6.

Plaintiffs admit the allegation in paragraph 5 that plaintiffs' property is

adjacent to defendant Vances' property and that the two parcels share a common boundary.
Plaintiffs deny that the location of the common boundary is in dispute.
7.

Plaintiffs admit that before purchasing their property, they were notified that

no survey had been performed. Plaintiffs are without sufficient knowledge to admit or
deny whether defendants Vance were notified at the time of sale that no survey had been
performed.
8.

Plaintiffs admit that they began constructing a home on their property in the

summer of 2005 and that they discussed obtaining a survey with the defendants Vance.
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Plaintiffs deny the remammg allegations set forth m paragraph 7 of the defendants'
Counterclaim.
9.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 8.

10.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations contained in paragraph 9.

11.

Plaintiffs lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegation set forth

in paragraph 10 of the defendants' Counterclaim alleging that the defendants sent plaintiffs
a written demand letter. Plaintiffs deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph
10.
12.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 11 to the extent it

incorporates allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs.
13.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 12.

14.

Plaintiffs deny the allegation set forth in paragraph 13.

15.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 14.

16.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 15.

17.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 16 to the extent it

realleges allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs.
18.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 17.

19.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 18.

20.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 19.

21.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 20.

22.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 21 to the extent it

realleges allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs.
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT VANCES'
COUNTERCLAIM - 3
toc/hoch _johnlp leadings/answer-sweet

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501
(208)743-1516; Fax (208)746-2231

35f

23.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 22.

24.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 23.

25.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 24.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

As affirmative defenses, the plaintiffs allege and state:
1.

Defendant Vances' Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.
2.

The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

3.

The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of equitable

estoppel.
4.

The defendants' Counterclaim is barred by accord and satisfaction and/or

under the doctrine of laches.
5.

Defendants previously released the plaintiffs from any liability stemming

from the allegations raised in the defendants' Counterclaim.
6.

The defendants acted with unclean hands and are not entitled to equitable

relief.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed, that
defendants take nothing thereby, that the plaintiffs be awarded their costs incurred herein,
including attorney fees, and that plaintiffs be granted such other and further relief as the
Court may deem warranted.
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DATED this 11th day of August, 2010.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

?kduf:JG~
Theodore 0. Creason
Attorney for Plaintiffs
John and Carole Hoch
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

) Case No. CVOS-2272
)
) ANSWER TO DEFENDANT
) SWEETS' COUNTERCLAIM
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

For answer to defendant Sweets' Counterclaim, the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and
Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, admit, deny, and allege as follows:
RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS IN COUNTERCLAIM
1.

As to the allegations set forth in defendant Sweets' Counterclaim, the

plaintiffs deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein.
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT SWEETS'
COUNTERCLAIM - 1
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2.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.1.

3.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.2.

· 4.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.3.

5.

Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.4.

6.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.1.

7.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.2.

8.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.3.

9.

Plaintiffs admit that they have constructed a residence on real property

owned by them as alleged in paragraph 2.4. Plaintiffs deny the remaining allegations set
forth in paragraph 2.4.
10.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained in paragraph 3 .1 to the extent it

realleges facts already denied by the plaintiffs.
11.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.2.

12.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.3.

13.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.4.

14.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.5.

15.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.1 to the extent it

realleges facts already denied by the plaintiffs. ·
16.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.2.

17.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.3.

18.

Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.4.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
As affirmative defenses, the plaintiffs allege and state:
1.

Defendant Sweets' Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.
2.

The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of equitable

estoppel.
3.

The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of laches.

4.

The defendants acted with unclean hands and are not entitled to equitable

relief.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed, that
defendants take nothing thereby, that the plaintiffs be awarded their costs incurred herein,
including attorney fees, and that plaintiffs be granted such other and relief as the Court may
deem warranted.
DATED this 1 lth day of August, 2010.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

a~~~
Theodore 0. Creason
Attorney for Plaintiffs
John and Carole Hoch
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of August, 2010, a copy of the foregoing
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO:
1
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE~UNTY . F NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY
VANCE, husband imd wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

L)tr1J

1 \

CASE NO. CV 08-2272

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Tiris case comes before me on the Hochs's motion for judgment on the pleadings based
on claim preclusion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 2, 2009, the Hochs and Vances settled various property claims against each other
through a mediation agreement. On July 13, 2009, pursuant to that agreement, all of the
V ances' s previously asserted counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice.
However, new disagteements have arisen, and, on June 23, 2010, the Hochs filed an
Amended Complaint. In response, the Vances answered and counterclaimed, asserting trespass
. and breach of restrictive covertCll1ts claims, ru1d asking for a declaratory judgment establishing the
boundru·y line between the parties' properties. The Hoclis now move for judgtnent on the
pleadings concerning those counterclaims.
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II. CONTENTIONS
The Hochs assert that all of the Vances's current counterclaims mirror their prior
counterclaims that were dismissed with prejudice. The Hoc11S therefore contend that the V ances
should be precluded from asserting their counterclaims. Further, the Hochs also contend that it is
frivolous to assert claims identical to those previously dismissed with prejudice, and therefore the
Vances's lawyer, 11r. Carr, has violated LR.C.P. § 11, and should be liable for the reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred to bring this motion.
The Vances did not present any argument to justify the asse1iion of the breach of
rest:Iictive covenants claim. As to the trespass claim, the Vances contend that it is not precluded
because it asserts acts of trespass occurring after the date of settlement; and after the date of
dismissal. Concerning the claim for a declaratory judgment, the Vances contend that it is
necessary to reassert that claim because the judgment establishing the property boundary was
never filed as it should have been, pursuant to the settlement agreement.

III. STAl\TDARD OF REVIEW
When an I.R.C.P. § 12(c) motion is decided on evidence in addition to the pleadings, the
court must treat and dispose of the motion as one for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. § 56.

Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 273 (1977) (citing Cookv. Saltman, 96 Idaho 187,
188 (1974), disagreed with on other grounds by Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 643-44 (1976)).
Because I consider the Hochs's.exhibits, in addition to the pleadings, I must decide this motion
as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together vvith the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P. § 56(c).
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Furthermore, this court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, G

& Ai Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Vances's Claim for Declaratory Judgment is Precluded Because it is Identical to one
Previously Dismissed With Prejudice.
A claim is certainly precluded when it is identical to one previously asserted but
dismissed with prejudice. See Km.vai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614 (1992)
(citing Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 148 (1990)). In this case, the Vances's
counterclaim asking for a·declaratory judgment is an exact copy of the claim for declaratory
judgment that was previously dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, the facts relied on are the
same. Therefore, the current declaratory judgment claim is precluded.

B. The Vimces's Claim of Breach of Restrictive Covenants is Partially Precluded Because it
Arose out of the Sarne "Transaction of Series of Transactions" as the Claims Previously
Dismissed.
A claim need not be identical to one previously dismissed in order for preclusion to
apply. Rather, all claims are precluded that arise out of the "same transaction or series of
transactions" as claims previously dismissed. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146,
150 (1990).
The V ances'-s claim of breach of restrictive covenants asserts in part that the Hochs are in
violation of a covenant requiring that all construction of buildings be completed within one year.
-----.·- .. AJthoughtheVancests did not assert this violation in th~ir prior, dismissed, claim, they_.did
assert other harms in connection with the Hochs's construction activities, and that the Hochs
began construction of their home in 2005. Therefore, the violation of the covenant was present at
the time of the dismissal and was part of the same transaction making up the Vances' s prior
claims: constmction activities by the Hochs. Thus, the part of the Vances's current claim for
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breach of covenants based on taldng more than one year to construct a building is precluded.
The Vances's claim of breach of restrictive covenants also asse1is that the Hochs have
violated restTictions requiring that all parcels be kept "clean and attractive" and "free and clear of
debris." This portion of the claim asserts that, due to the Hochs's construction activities, the
Hochs's property is untidy, in violation of the restrictions.
Again, this claim arises out of the same transaction as the dismissed claims: the Hochs's
construction activities. However, there is an exception to the "same transaction" rule where the
claimant did not know, nor should have known, the facts supporting a claim arising from the
same transaction. See Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614 (1992). It is unclear
in this case whether or not the clutter complained of existed prior to the dismissal. If not, then
the Vances could not have k:novm of the facts supporting their claim, and the claim would not be
precluded. Because I must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Vances, I
must conclude that the trash complained of is not any that was present prior to the previous
dismissal. Therefore, claim preclusion does not bar the V ances's claim of breach of restrictive
covenants so far as it is based on the untidiness of the Hochs' s property.
C. The Vances 's Trespass Claim is not Precluded Because it is Based 011 Facts Arising After
the Dismissal

The V ances' s trespass claim mirrors the claim previously dismissed, except that it states
that the acts of trespass occurred from July 2, 2009 (the date of the mediation agreement) to the
present. All Of the alleged trespasses are related to the Hochs' s construction activities, and
therefore arise out of the same transaction or occunence as the V ances' s dismissed claims.
However, the Vances' s counsel stated in oral argument on this motion that the general allegations
in their statement of their tresp3;Ss claim are meant to allege that, since the time of the mediation
agreement and dismissal, the Hochs have deposited new construction debris in new locations on
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the Vances's property and have driven vehicles across new parts of the Vances's property that the
Hochs have no legal right to cross. Because I must draw all inferences in favor of the Vances, I
must infer that the language of the current trespass claim is meant to allege trespassory acts not
occun-ing prior to the dismissal of the Vances's prior claims. The Vances's trespass claim is
therefore not precluded, as it facts occurring after the dismissal.

D. llfr. Carr is Li<lblefor Rule 11 Sanctions.for Asserting the Claimfor Declaratory Relief.
LR. C.P. § 11 calls for the imposition of sanctions against the one signing a pleading if a
claim is brought to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation." In this case, I can see no other purpose in the assertion of the claim for declaratory
relief other than to retaliate by increasing the Hochs's litigation costs.
The claim is identical to one previously dismissed with prejudice. In their "Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," the Vances argued, without submitting any
evidence, that the basis of all of their counterclaims was that the Hochs were not in compliance
with the Mediation Agreement. Even assuming this explanation as fact, it is not a justification
for the request for a declaration as to the location of the property boundary. So, at oral argument,

Mr. Carr had created a new justification: due to an oversight by himself, an agreed order as to the
property boundary had not been filed since the agreement. Although this may be a justification
for why an order as to the location of the property boundary is justified, it is not a justification for
re-asserting a previously dismissed claim. Mr. Can simply needed to contact the Hochs's
counsel and request that they agree to an order establishing the property line agreed to in
mediation.
Because Mr. Carr is the one who signed the answer and counterclaim, he is liable. As
only one of the three claims in this case was brought for an improper purpose, sanctions are
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limited to one-111ird of the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the Hochs to bring this motion.
V. CONCLUSION
The Vances's claim for declaratory judgment is precluded because an identical claim was
previously dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, their claim for breach of the restrictive
covena11t requiring that construction activities be.completed within a year is precluded because it
arises from the same transaction as previously dismissed claims: the Hochs's construction
activities. However, the claims of trespass and breach of the restrictive covenant requiring
premises be kept free of construction debris are not precluded. Although both are related to the
same transaction as claims previously dismissed, they both asse1t facts occurring after the
dismissal, and therefore preclusion does not apply.

The claim for declaratory judgment was brought without any discernible purpose other
than to increase the costs of litigation. Therefore, Mr. Carr, as the signatory to the Vances's
answer and counterclaim, is liable to the Hochs for the attorneys' fees that can be attributed to
defending the declaratory judgment counterclaim: one-third of the total incurred in bringing the
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

VI. ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Hochs's motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED as to the Vances's claim for declaratory relief. The Hochs's motion for judgment on
the pleadings is GRANTED as to the Vances's claim of a violation of restrictive covenants by
taking more than one year to complete construction. The Hochs's motion for judgment on the
pleadings is DENIED as to the Vances's claim of a violation of restrictive covenants by not
keeping the Hoch property free of construction debris. The Hochs's motion for judgment on the
pleadings is DENIED as to the Vances's claim of trespass. Mr. W. Jeremy Can is ordered to pay
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to the Hochs one-third of the fees incurred in bringing their motion.
ITIS SO ORDERED, this

------- ------------------------------- -----

---

the~~p-010

------ - ---------------------------- ----- - -- --- -- -- --- --------------- ---- - ----- ,-------- -- -- --
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOl\TD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al\1D FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JAKE S\VEET and AUDREY SvVEET,
)
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
)
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
)
-- - -····· -- .- .- --- )
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CVOS-2272

JO:E-IN M. HOCH and CAROLED.
HOCH, husband and wife,

ORDER

·-

----

The Stipulation of the parties dated November

J1, 2010, having been filed

herewith) the Court being fully apprised, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

OlWER - 1
loclhoch_/ohnlpleadings!order

3b1
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The $1,000.00 currently owed by plaintiffs to defendants Vance, assessed

against them by Judge John Stegne.r pursuant to the remediation agreement) and the

$748.42 in attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs against defendants Vances' attorney,
W. Jeremy Can, in relation to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for
an Order to Dismiss the Counterclaim of Defendants Vance With Prejudice shall be offset
by plajntiffs paying to defendants Vance the amount of $25158.

2.

Payment of the $251.58 by plaintiffs to defendants Vance constitutes a full

and final resolution of the pending interlocutory assessments imposed.

l(f
DATED this l_!__ day ofNovember, 2010.
\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV08-02272
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and
Counterclaim. Plaintiffs Hoch were represented by attorney Theodore 0. Creason. Defendants
Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were represented
by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court, having read the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted
by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter,
hereby renders its decision.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch filed the above-entitled action
seeking to enjoin Defendants Sweet and Vance from obstructing and blocking Plaintiffs' use of a
road easement Plaintiffs contend they received within the deed to their property. Defendants
Sweet filed an Answer denying Plaintiffs Hoch hold any property interest in Sweets' property, in
particular denying Hochs hold a right of easement over Sweets' property. Defendants Vance
filed an Answer and Courterclaim, asserting by way of Answer that Plaintiffs have no easement
right upon Defendant Vances' property and by way of Counterclaim that the Court should
declare the survey contracted for by Defendants Vance to be the true boundary between
Plaintiffs' property and Defendant Vances' property and asserting a claim for trespass.
However, early in the litigation, Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Vance resolved the issues
re lati ve to V ances' counterclaims and the parties stipulated to dismissal of the counterclaims
with prejudice.
Approximately one year after the filing of the above-entitled lawsuit, Plaintiffs Hoch
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Following a hearing on the Motion, the Court granted
Plaintiffs summary judgment, finding the warranty deed for the property purchased by the Hochs
provided them an easement right in what the parties refer to as the upper road but leaving for
later determination the scope and location of the easement road. Plaintiffs subsequently sought
to amend their Complaint to include claims for nuisance, trespass, breach of covenant, and
assault, which the Court granted. Defendants Sweet filed an Answer and Counterclaims for
declaratory judgment as to boundary lines, trespass and breach of restrictive covenants in
response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Defendants Vance also filed an Answer and
Counterclaims for declaratory judgment as to boundary lines, trespass and breach of restrictive
2
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covenants in response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs subsequently filed Answers
to the Counterclaims filed by Defendants Sweet and Vance and sought dismissal of the
Counterclaims of Defendants Vance based on the stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the
Vances' counterclaims plead earlier in the litigation. Following a hearing on the issues, the
Court dismissed the Vances' second claim for declaratory judgment and part of the Vances'
breach ofrestrictive covenants claim but let the Vances' trespass claim stand.
On July 12, 2011, Defendants Sweet filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and
Counterclaim. Defendants Vance filed notice of non-opposition. However, Plaintiffs Hoch have
filed a brief in opposition, assert the Motion is untimely, will result in delay and seeks to raise
issues already decided in the Court's ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment.
ANALYSIS

Defendants Sweet seek to amend their Answer and Counterclaims to add a claim for
declaratory judgment, asking the Court to find that I.C. § 55-313 allows the Sweets to
unilaterally relocate the road that is Plaintiffs' easement. Idaho Code§ 55-313 reads:
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication,
has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the
person or persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at
their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but
such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such
access.

In a recent Idaho Supreme Court ruling, the Court held that "the clear implication of LC.
§ 55-313 is to allow for the relocation of an access road where such relocation does not injure
interested parties - even where that road takes the form of an express easement - without the
consent of the dominant estate holder(s)." Statewide Construction, Inc. v. Pietri, 150 Idaho 423,

3
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429, 247 P.3d 650, 656 (2011). The Court's recent ruling is significant to the issue raised by
Defendants Sweet on Motion to Amend.
In the instant matter, Judge Bradbury ruled that the warranty deed held by Plaintiffs Hoch
provides them an easement for ingress and egress across the 'upper road' running upon
Defendants Sweets' property. However, a number of issues remain to be determined in the
litigation, including the location and scope of the easement road. The Court's ruling in Statewide

Construction, Inc. v. Pietri and Defendant Sweets' notice of their intent to invoke rights they
have under LC. § 55-313 may have significant impact on the final outcome in the litigation.
Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy and the economic interests of the parties, the Court
finds the application ofl.C. § 55-313 should be determined concurrent with the remaining
matters in the litigation rather than in a separate action, as could occur.

ORDER
The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Sweets' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and
Counterclaim.

Dated this

/P

day of August 2011.

4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO

AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was:

~d delivered via court basket, or
_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2011, to:

l}_ day of August

Edwin L Litteneker
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston, ID, 83501
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P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID, 83501
Theodore 0 Creason
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID, 83501
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322 Main Street
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Telephone: (208) 746-0344
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH,
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
V.

JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

Case No. CV 08-2272

AMENDED ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM

COME NOW Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet, wife and husband, by and
through their attorney of record, Edwin L. Litteneker and answers the Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint and Counterclaims against the Plaintiffs as follows:
1.

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet admit paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
11, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

2.

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet deny paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18
19- 45 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

AMENDED ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any interest in the property of the
Defendants Sweet.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Plaintiff's have proceeded in this matter Vvith unclean hands and are not entitled to
the equitable remedy sought herein.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Plaintiffs' have failed to name indispensable parties.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Plaintiffs' claim is frivolous.
The Defendants Sweets reserve the right to add parties, claims, or defenses based upon
discovery in this matter.
COUNTERCLAIM

As counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet do
complain and allege as follows:
1.

Parties.

1.1

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are husband and wife.

1.2

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are husband and wife.

1.3

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are owners of certain real property

situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho more particularly described as follows:
The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez Perce County,
AMENDED ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM
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Idaho.
1.4

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are owners of certain real property

situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly described as follows:
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce
County, Idaho.
2.

Factual Allegations.

2.1

Sweet has constructed at their sole expense a roadway commencing at Stage

Coach Road and proceeding in a Southeasterly direction, then east which ends at their residence.
2.2

Such roadway was constructed at Sweet's sole expense and provision of labor,

contracted labor and the purchase of materials necessary to build the roadway.
2.3

Such roadway did not exist prior to Sweet's construction of the roadway.

2.4

Such roadway was constructed to service Sweet's residence in a manner

convenient to Sweet's use of their property and the location of Sweet's residence. It was not
intended by Sweet's to serve Roch's residence or to be used by Hoch to access Roch's property.
2.5 Hoch has constructed a residence on the real property owned by them. In connection
with the construction of the home, excavation occurred which resulted in excess excavation
material from Roch's excavation being deposited on Sweet's property.
3.

Trepass.

3 .1

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing allegations.

3.2

In approximately July of 2004 without permission from the Sweet's, Hoch, their

agents or employees deposited rock on the Sweet's property.
3.3

Such rock remains located on the Sweet property without Sweet's permission and

is a continuing trespass.
AMENDED ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM
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3.4

Such rock continues to affect the use of the Sweet property.

3.5

Sweet is damaged by the rock being deposited on Sweet's property by Hoch.

4.

Unjust Enrichment.

4.1

Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing allegations.

4.2

If such roadway is determined to be real property within which Hoch has an

interest, the real property of sweet was improved to its present condition without any
contribution, participation or expense by Hoch.
4.3

Should Hoch be entitled to use such improvements as constructed by Sweet, Hoch

and Hoch's real property interest are unjustly enriched by the actions of Sweet.
4.4

Hoch should compensate Sweet in an amount to be determined by the Court based

upon the expenses, costs, labor and materials incurred by Sweet to improve the real property
interest of Hoch.
5. Declaratory Judgment.

5.1. The Court shall declare that the route for Hoch' s access to their residence should be
as generally illustrated in the attached Exhibit A.
5.2 Such declaratory relief is not otherwise available to the Sweet's and no remedy at
law is available.
5.3 Such location of Roch's "access road" will provide adequate and appropriate access
to Hoch's property across Sweet's property.
6. Attorney Fees. The Defendants, Jake and Audrey Sweet have engaged the services of

the undersigned in the defense and pursuant of this matter and have incurred attorney fees and
costs. Such fees and costs should be paid by the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120,
Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho Code§ 45-612, and LC. § 6-202.
AMENDED ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT
& COUNTERCLAIM

4

WHEREFORE Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet pray for relief as follows:
1. That the Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as it relates to the

Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet.
2. That the Court deny any injunction or restraint of Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweets'
future actions.
3. That Hoch be required to remove such rock placed on Sweet's property without
permission by Hoch.
4. That Sweet receive damages for Roch's trespass and unjust enrichment as the Court
may determine appropriate.
5. That the Roch's access road and corresponding easement be established as is
illustrated in Exhibit A.
6. An award of attorney fees and costs to the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet.
7. For other such relief as the Court deems just and equi
DATED this

11_ day of August, 2011.
Attorney at Law
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)

Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states as
follows:
We are one of the about named defendants named herein. We have read the foregoing
document and know the contents thereof and the facts stated thvr·\~.r}:·
.•true to the best of our
knowledge.
)\) •

!6_/

~

~-J;,-'-4--e-S-w~ee~t=--~~~~~~~~-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public on this\ i- day of August
2011.

Residing at L
ton
My Comm. Exp 1\+.,,o.>-,_&-\,, o \ , '1...t>\S
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing
document was:

_L mailed by regular first class mail,
and deposited in the United States
Post Office
_ _ sent by facsimile
_ _ sent by Federal Express, overnight
delivery
hand delivered

To:

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501
W. Jeremy Carr
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

on this

_fl_ day of August 2011.

Edwin L. Litteneker
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORT

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
V.

JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV08-02272
FINDINGS OFF ACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

This matter came before the Court for trial on December 12, 13, and 14, 2011. Plaintiffs
Hoch were represented by attorneys Theodore 0. Creason and Samuel T. Creason. Defendants
Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were represented
by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court, having considered the record in this matter, the
testimony presented, the arguments and exhibits submitted by the parties, the applicable law, and
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order.

Hoch v. Sweet and Vance
Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order

3f5

FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs Hoch filed a Verified Complaint to Enjoin Defendants
from Obstructing Easement after disputes arose between Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Sweets
and V ances regarding road usage and easements. On October 28, 2008, Defendants Vance filed
an Answer and Counterclaim along with a Lis Pendens filing against Plaintiffs property. On
March 30, 2009, Defendants Sweet filed an Answer. On July 2, 2009, the parties entered into a
mediation which resulted in a resolution being reached as to Defendant Vance's counterclaim,
but did not result in a full resolution of the easement dispute.
On October 21, 2009, Plaintiffs Hoch filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Motion was heard by District Judge John Bradbury, who is now retired. On December 23, 2009,
Judge Bradbury entered his Memorandum Decision and Order, wherein he found: (a) Jack
Cridlebaugh was the owner of ninety (90) acres of land in the Waha area; (b) Cridlebaugh sold
twenty (20) acres to the Vances in 2000, forty (40) acres to the Sweets in 2001, and twenty (20)
acres to the Hochs in 2002; and (c) Cridlebaugh retained ten (10) acres of the ninety acre parcel.
Judge Bradbury then found language in the relevant deeds contained unambiguous language that
granted an appurtenant easement on the "upper road" to Hochs and Sweets. Judge Bradbury,
while granting the Hochs' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding conveyance of an easement
to Hochs, specifically noted his ruling did not address the precise "route or scope" of the Hoch
easement. 1
Following the Court's grant of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hochs
sought, and the Court granted, leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint,

1

Judge Bradbury's decision referenced the language in the Hoch warranty deed that conveyed Cridlebaugh's
reservation of easement upon all existing roads and is, therefore, part of the determination to be made in determining
the "route and scope" of the Hoch easement rights pursuant to their warranty deed.
2
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filed June 23, 2010, asserts claims for: (I) Nuisance; (II) Trespass; (III) Breach of Covenant; and
(IV) Assault. On July 29, 2010, Defendants Vance filed an Amended Answer and
Counterclaims, asserting counterclaims for: (A) Declaratory Judgment 2 ; (B) Trespass; and (C)
Breach of Restrictive Covenants. On August 4, 2010, Defendants Sweet filed an Amended
Answer and Counterclaims, asserting counterclaims for: (A) Trespass; (B) Unjust Emichment;
and (C) Declaratory Judgment. Each of the parties seeks attorney's fees in their pleadings. On
July 12, 2011, Defendants Sweet moved to amend their Amended Answer and Counterclaims to
add a claim for Declaratory Judgment, which was granted by the Court on August 10, 2011.
Defendants Sweet Declaratory Judgment claim seeks the right to move the upper road easement
pursuant to I. C. § 5 5-313.
At trial, the Court heard from a number of witnesses, including Plaintiff John Hoch and
Defendants Rob Vance, Audrey Sweet and Jake Sweet. The parties, understanding the Court's
earlier ruling that found the deed from Jack Cridlebaugh to Plaintiffs Hoch granted Plaintiffs
easement upon what the parties describe as the "upper road'', nevertheless dispute the scope and
location of the upper road. At issue for this Court to determine is what constitutes a road and
where upon the property the "upper road" existed at the time Cridlebaugh reserved and conveyed
the appurtenant easement rights at issue. In discussing the roads at issue, the parties used the
terms "upper road" and "lower road". There is no issue before the Court as to the "lower road"
as defined by the parties. However, at issue for determination is the route or location of the
"upper road" as that term is used by the parties.

2

On Motion of Plaintiff, on October 25, 2010 Judge Bradbury dismissed Defendant Vances' counterclaim for
Declaratory Judgment and Breach of Restrictive Covenants only as to the claim that construction had taken more
than one year, but not as to construction debris left on the V ances' property.
3
Hoch v. Sweet and Vance
Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order

3f7

In deposition3, Jack Cridlebaugh testified that when he sold property to the Vances, he
gave them an easement right on the lower road only. 4 When he sold to Sweets, he originally
planned to give them easement rights on the lower road only but, after discussing the matter with
them, decided to give them easement rights on both the lower and upper roads. 5 Cridlebaugh
further testified that when he sold property to the Hochs, his intent was to give them easement
rights on the lower road only, as he had assured the Sweets he would not give anyone easement
rights over the upper road without their approval. 6
Defendant Rob Vance testified that when he purchased his property from Jack
Cridlebaugh in 2000, he was given easement rights on the "lower road" only. However, wanting
a shorter access route to his property, Defendant Vance contacted adjacent landowner McKenna
to discuss obtaining easement rights across his property via what is commonly referred to as
Buckboard Lane. Defendant Vance testified Buckboard Lane was not part of the lower or upper
Cridlebaugh road, but rather was barely more than a trail that ran in an east/west direction on the
Vance and McKenna properties. After Vance obtained easement rights from McKenna, in 2002
or 2003 he hired Willis Humphreys to build the road now known as Buckboard Lane, which runs
east/west across the Vance and Mc Kenna properties and connects at the east end with
Stagecoach Road 7 and ends at the west end on the Vance property.
Plaintiff John Hoch testified that in 2002, when he viewed the property he subsequently
purchased, Cridlebaugh took him there by way of the lower road. When Plaintiff purchased the

3

Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and as attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Vance on November 23, 2009.
4
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 30.
5
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 24-25.
6
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 25-32.
7
Stagecoach Road is a county public road. However, Buckboard Lane, Black Bear Bend, and the roads referred to
as the upper road and lower road are private roads.
4
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property, it was his understanding that Cridlebaugh would only convey easement rights on the
lower road. In 2005 Plaintiff Hoch spoke to Defendants Sweet about using the upper road to
access his property, as it was a better route for construction crews who would be building a log
home on the property. The Sweets agreed to Roch's use of the upper road, at least through the
construction phase of Roch's home. However, by 2008, the Sweets informed Plaintiffs they
could no longer use the upper road and, on several occasions, work crews attempting to get to the
Hoch property by way of the upper road found their passage impeded because rocks, snow or
equipment had been placed in the road. By this time, Hoch believed his deed included easement
rights on both the lower and upper road and, when he was unable to reach an understanding with
the Defendants, filed suit to resolve the easement dispute. The Court subsequently determined
by the Court that Plaintiff Hoch had received easement rights in the upper road, but the ruling
left for later determination a definition of the route and scope of the road.
In addition to the testimony of witnesses at trial, the record contains the deposition
transcript of Jack Cridlebaugh taken on April 15, 2009 and made part of the record on November
19, 2009 8 . In addition to the undisputed easement right Plaintiffs have on the lower road,
Plaintiffs also claim their deed provides them easement rights on the upper road and on the
section of Buckboard Lane that currently exists on the property of Defendants' Vance. 9 The
Court, in its summary judgment ruling, determined Plaintiffs deed conveyed ingress/egress
easement rights on the upper road and also conveyed "an easement over and across all roadways
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed" 10 but left for later determination

8

Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and as attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Vance on November 23, 2009.
9
Plaintiffs' theory is that the portion of Buckboard Lane that is on the Vance property was an extension or the upper
road.
10
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 105 and 106.
5
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whether the road now known as Buckboard Lane was a road "presently existing" at the time
Cridlebaugh conveyed to Vances the property they now own. 11 The testimony of Jack
Cridlebaugh in his deposition is critical to the analysis ofthis issue. If the portion of Buckboard
Lane that currently exists on the Vance property was a "roadway" at the time Cridlebaugh
conveyed his property to the V ances, then it would fall within the reserved easement language in
the Vance deed that was incorporated into the Hoch deed. If it was not a "roadway" at the time
of conveyance to V ances, then Cridlebaugh had no easement reservation that would have
transferred to Hochs.
While the road easement issue is the primary issue in dispute, the parties have asserted a
number of other claims and counterclaims. In support of those claims, the parties presented the
Court with a number of photographs in support of their testimony regarding the various
additional claims and counterclaims. Included among the photographs are pictures showing
equipment, cattle guards, gates, and rock berms in the roadway. There are also pictures of
construction debris, brush piles and a proposed new road. Each of the deeds received by the
parties contains the same covenants and restrictions. At issue are the following covenants and
restrictions: (a) each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner; (b) outbuildings, such
as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design to and compliment the
structure constructed on the parcel; (c) no fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way; (d)
no noxious, illegal or offensive activity, nor any activity that may become a nuisance to the
neighborhood or may materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each respective parcel
owner; (e) the exterior of any structure, residence or outbuildings shall be completed within one
year of obtaining proper building permits; and (f) during the period of construction, the owner is

11

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 107 at,if 5 and 6.
6
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to keep the premises free and clear of debris and waste matter, disposing such in a manner that
imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(A) ROUTE AND SCOPE OF "UPPER ROAD"
As previously stated, the Court has already determined that Plaintiffs Hoch have an
easement right for ingress and egress on the "upper road" by way of conveyance in the warranty
deed from Jack Cridlebaugh to the Hochs. 13 However, the Court left for later determination the
route and scope of the "upper road". The evidence as to the route of the upper road is relatively
undisputed. Jack Cridlebaugh testified in deposition that sometime in the late 90's he purchased
ninety (90) acres in rural Nez Perce County in the area commonly known as Waha.

14

Cridlebaugh stated that when he purchased the property there were two access roads, "the lower
one off of Stagecoach and the upper one off of Stagecoach." 15 Cridlebaugh then described the
route of the "upper road" as leaving Stagecoach Road and going across the Carpenter property,
then onto the Weinert property, then onto the ten acres still owned by Cridlebaugh, then across
what is now the Sweet property, then onto what is now the Hoch property, where it tied into the
lower road. 16 The upper road as described by Cridlebaugh, i.e. from Stagecoach Road to the
Hoch property, was subsequently designated by Nez Perce County as Black Bear Bend. 17
Cridlebaugh further testified that the lower road was primarily a four-wheeler trail when he
12

Plaintiffs' Exhibits 105, 106, and 107.
The Court found that, despite a contrary intent by Jack Cridlebaugh, the language in the Hoch warranty deed
conveyed to Hocbs easement rights in both the upper and lower roads.
14
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 6-7.
15
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 8.
16
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 9-10.
17
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10-1 shows Black Bear Bend as a loop. However, the map appears to either be inaccurate or to
have omissions as it does not indicate the location of Buckboard Lane or the road referred to by the parties as the
lower road.
13

7
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purchased the property, but that the upper road was passable by way of pickup truck. 18
However, prior to selling any of the property, Cridlebaugh had work done on the roads. The
Sweets further improved the upper road, predominantly following the existing route that had
always provided access.
The parties have not disputed the route of the upper road and, therefore, there is little
more the Court can add as to route. As for scope, the easement right on the upper road is defined
in the Hoch warranty deed as limited to ingress and egress.
(B) THE VANCE PORTION OF BUCKBOARD LANE

In dispute is whether Plaintiffs Hoch received easement rights in that portion of
Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property. The evidence on this issue is less than clear.
Jack Cridlebaugh, when asked to describe the upper road, stated:
It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from, well,
from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a loop before I
bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a westerly direction in
front ofVances, made a loop out toward the Hochs' property and then went right
back up this way, out to my ten acres.
Jack Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p. 19.
Cridlebaugh' s description of the upper road, as stated in his deposition at page 19 is,
however, in conflict with other of his testimony. In his deposition, Cridlebaugh stated he did not
have easement rights on Buckboard Lane. When asked if there were any roadways in place that
provided access to the Hoch, Sweet, or Vance properties during the time period of 1997 to 2001,
Cridlebaugh stated, "No. The only three accesses were the upper road, this Buckboard Lane and
this lower road. I didn't have access over Buckboard Lane." 19 Therefore, at the time
Cridlebaugh sold V ances their property, the upper road could not have come up Buckboard Lane
18

19

Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 11.
Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p. 20 [emphasis added].
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and made a loop back across V ances', Hochs', and Sweets properties and onto the ten acres
currently owned by Cridlebaugh. A careful reading of Cridlebaugh's testimony reveals his
statement was that the described loop existed before he bought the property. There is, however,
no evidence before the Court that suggests Cridlebaugh, who had no easement right on the
portion of Buckboard Lane that currently crosses the McKenna property, maintained or utilized
the portion of Buckboard Lane that crosses the Vance property. Therefore, the Court must
determine if the Vance portion of Buckboard Lane was a "roadway" at the time Cridlebaugh
conveyed his property to the V ances and whether it was considered part of the upper road.
Defendant's Exhibit 200 is a 1998 aerial photo of those portions of the Cridlebaugh
ninety acres that were eventually sold to Vance, Sweet, and Hoch. The photo clearly appears to
depict what came to be known as Buckboard Lane, showing it from the point it leaves
Stagecoach Road, passing across the McKenna property and across the Vance property, onto the
Hoch property where it tied into the intersection of the upper and lower roads. Defendant Vance
testified he purchased his property from Cridlebaugh in October 2000, approximately two years
after the 1998 aerial photo was taken. The only ingress/egress access Vance received was an
easement right on the lower road, as Cridlebaugh did not have an easement right on Buckboard
Lane where it crosses the McKenna property. After purchasing his property, Vance and
McKenna entered into a reciprocal easement agreement that gave Vance easement rights on the
McKenna portion of Buckboard Lane.
Vance testified he had walked the area of his property that is now Buckboard Lane before
and after purchasing his property and stated it appeared to be an old skidder trail that had ruts in
it, indicating it had been traveled at some point. After obtaining easement rights from the

9
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McKennas, Vance testified he hired an individual to build Buckboard Lane so that he would
have better access to and from Stagecoach Road.
The Court finds the evidence shows the portion of Buckboard Lane that runs upon the
Vance property was an existing road at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed property to the V ances
and clearly appears on the 1998 aerial photograph20 as an extension of the upper road. As a
result, it was subject to the reservation of easement rights retained by Cridlebaugh in the Vance
Warranty Deed, and was an easement right conveyed to the Hochs by incorporation of that
easement right in the Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to Hoch. However, the Hochs need to be
cognizant of the limits of their easement right on Buckboard Lane. It does not include any
portion of Buckboard Lane not on the Vance property. Therefore, it does not convey to Hochs
any right in that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the McKenna property and does not
provide Hochs access to Stagecoach Road by means of Buckboard Lane. The Hochs have no
easement right in that portion of Buckboard Lane that runs across the McKenna property. Jack
Cridlebaugh at no time had an easement right on the McKenna portion of Buckboard Lane and,
therefore, he could not convey to the Hochs that which he did not have.
(C) RELOCATION OF UPPER ROAD PURSUANT TO I.C.§ 55-313

Defendants Sweet seek a declaratory judgment from the Court allowing them to relocate
the portion of the upper road that traverses their property. The proposed route of the relocation
has been identified and roughed-in on the ground by a bulldozer, but no graveling, drainage, or
other improvements have been made to the proposed new road. Idaho Code provides:
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication,
has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the
person or persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at
their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but
20

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #7.
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such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such
access.
Idaho Code § 55-313.
At trial, the Court heard testimony from Raymond Flowers, a registered Professional
Engineer with over fifty-five years of road engineering experience. Mr. Flowers was hired by
22

Plaintiffs Hoch to inspect the proposed new road21 and then provide a written report regarding
his inspection and expert opinion as to the feasibility of the proposed new road. Mr. Flowers
testified it was his opinion the proposed road increased the travel distance to the Hoch property
by approximately 1900 feet over the current route, the proposed route includes grades of 10% to
15%, the road width will accommodate only a single vehicle and has no turnouts or other means
to allow more than one vehicle to travel on the roadway, the road would require significant
sloping, berm removal and other drainage features before all-weather access would be possible,
and the road surface will be impassable during wet or snowy weather conditions unless
considerable amounts of rock and gravel are placed on the roadway. Defendants Sweet offered
no expert testimony to dispute the opinion of Mr. Flowers, offering instead their lay opinion that
the road is a travelable roadway.
The Court finds the proposed relocation of that section of the upper road that traverses
the Sweet property would cause injury to Plaintiffs Hoch. The proposed route nearly triples the
distance of the Sweet portion of the road and includes two steep grades of 10% or greater. The
increased distance and the steep grades would significantly add to the cost of maintaining the
road, would make the road impassable by ordinary vehicles except under the most ideal weather
and surface conditions, creates safety risks as it is only wide enough for a single vehicle, and the
21
22

Plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 through 26-44 depict the proposed new road.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28.
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ability to provide year around access is questionable. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant
Sweets are enjoined from relocating the portion of roadway at issue to the proposed location.
(D) TRESPASS CLAIMS/COUNTERCLAIMS

After Plaintiffs Hoch rested their case in chief, Defendants Sweet and Vance moved for a
directed verdict on Hochs' claims for trespass. The Court took the motion under advisement and
now enters its ruling along with an analysis of the counterclaim for trespass asserted by
Defendants Vance.
Plaintiffs Hoch alleged Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance have entered onto
Plaintiffs property without permission, thus committing trespass. In particular, Plaintiffs Hoch
allege Defendant Audrey Sweet entered onto the Hoch property and aggressively approached
John Hoch while waiving papers at him. Defendants Sweet and Vance both assert counterclaims
contending Plaintiffs Hoch have entered onto each of their respective properties without
permission, thus committing trespass. In particular, Defendants Sweet allege Plaintiffs Hoch,
their agents or employees, without the permission of the Sweets, deposited rock onto the Sweet
property in July 2004 causing damage to the Sweet property. Defendants Vance assert Plaintiffs
Hoch have committed trespass by allowing construction and other types of debris to go onto the
Vance property23 .
The Court finds there has been no trespass by the Defendants upon Plaintiffs' property.
The Court was presented with no evidence that Plaintiffs have no-trespassing signs marking their
property, no evidence that Plaintiffs informed the Defendants they were not allowed onto their
property, and presented no evidence Plaintiffs were damaged by the Defendants going onto their

23

This claim is limited to any trespass that occurred after July 2, 2009. See Memorandum Decision and Order
entered by Judge Bradbury on October 25, 2010 regarding claims that survived the mediation agreement between
Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Vance.
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property. To the contrary, the clear evidence is that initially Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants
Sweet and Vance considered each other friends, engaging in social activities together. While the
relationships appear to have soured, the Court was presented with no evidence that the
relationships had become so hostile that one party had forbidden the other from entering upon
their property in order to have a conversation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against the
Defendants for trespass are without merit.
Defendants Sweet and Vance both assert trespass claims against Plaintiffs for allowing
excavation and construction debris to go upon Defendants' properties. As for Defendants
Sweet's claim that Plaintiffs allowed rock debris to be placed on Sweet's property, the Court
finds Plaintiffs must remove any rock from the Sweet's property that is there as a result of it
being moved from Plaintiffs' property to Defendants Sweet's property during excavation on the
Hoch property. This will require Defendants Sweet allow Plaintiffs access to Sweet's property.
The same is true of any construction or other debris that Plaintiffs Hoch have allowed to travel
onto Defendants Vance's property. Plaintiffs Hoch are responsible for removing all of their
debris from the Vance's property. However, this will also require the cooperation of the parties
and permission from the Vance's for the Hochs or their agents to go onto the Vance property to
complete the task of cleaning up the debris. If Defendants Sweet or Defendants Vance are
unable or unwilling to cooperate in the removal of the Hochs' rock and debris from their
respective properties, then the Hochs will be relieved of their responsibility to remove the items
of trespass.
(E) PLAINTIFFS' ASSAULT CLAIM

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts Audrey Sweet committed an assault upon John
Hoch by aggressively approaching him and making physical threats, causing John Hoch to fear
13
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he was at risk of imminent hann. Plaintiffs, however, presented no evidence Audrey Sweet at
any time threatened John Hoch and presented no evidence that John Hoch was fearful on the day
Audrey Sweet came to his Waha home to discuss his use of the upper road. Therefore,
Plaintiffs' claim for assault must be dismissed.
(F) PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIM
Plaintiffs allege Defendants Sweet and Vance interfered with the Hochs reasonable use
and comfortable enjoyment of their property by placing barriers in the easement roadway, thus
making the road impassable or requiring the Hochs to remove the barriers in order to utilize the
easement to reach their property. Plaintiffs Hoch seek relief by way of an injunction, damages,
or abatement.
The nuisance claim against Defendants Vance involved efforts by the Vances to block the
Hochs' use of Buckboard Lane where it traverses the Vances' property. While the Court found
the warranty deed to Plaintiffs Hoch conveyed an easement right upon that portion of Buckboard
Lane that traverses the Vance property, the Court also found the easement right upon the Vance
portion of Buckboard Lane is limited in scope and does not provide ingress and egress access for
the Hochs, as they have no easement right upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the
McKenna property and meets the public roadway known as Stagecoach Road.
The nuisance complained of by the Hochs as against the Vances was enjoined by the
Court in June 2010. During trial, Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they were damaged as a
result of being prevented from exercising their easement right upon the Vance portion of
Buckboard Lane, which does not provide Plaintiffs ingress and egress to their property.
Therefore, the appropriate relief is to permanently enjoin Defendants Vance from blocking the
roadway in a manner that prevents Plaintiffs from exercising their easement right. However,
14
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contrary to arguments put forth by Plaintiffs at trial, the Court does not find the placement of a
gate across any of the roadways upon which Plaintiffs have an easement right to be a barrier or
obstruction to Plaintiffs' easement right, so long as Plaintiffs have the ability to pass through any
gate.

24

As was stated by Idaho's Court of Appeals, "[L]imiting access to the easement to those

with use rights is sensible and benefits both parties". Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, 111
Idaho 370, 378, 723 P.2d 914 (1986). This is especially true in the parties' situation where their
homes are in a very rural area used by recreationalists, hunters, and people looking for firewood.
Plaintiffs have also asserted Defendants Sweet and Vance have placed barriers on the
upper road in order to prevent the Hochs use of the road. Any impediment to Plaintiffs use of the
upper road was enjoined by the Court in June 2010 and Plaintiffs presented no evidence that any
such activity has occurred since that time. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend Defendants efforts to
prevent them from using the upper road have damaged Plaintiffs ability to complete construction
on the home, and that it has cost them lost wages in dealing with the problem.
Plaintiffs are seeking a variety of monetary damages. First, Plaintiffs seek damages for
thirty months of mortgage payments on their Lewiston home, contending they had to make two
mortgage payments for a longer period than anticipated because of construction delays caused by
road barriers. The Court finds Plaintiffs' claim for mortgage damages too speculative. Plaintiffs
never engaged the services of a real estate agent, never placed their Lewiston home on the
market through an agent or by any other method, presented no evidence regarding the
marketability of the home or the likelihood of the home selling in the current housing market.
Plaintiff John Hoch testified they recently had the Waha home on the market for a short period
but had no interested buyers. The Court is also not persuaded that the sole delay in finishing
24

This will require that all parties with easement rights on a roadway be provided a key or the combination to any
lock that is placed on a gate.
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construction of Plaintiffs' Waha home was the few incidents of road barriers. Plaintiff John
Hoch testified he knew he had easement rights on the lower road and had used the lower road on
a number of occasions to access his property. Plaintiffs could have used the lower road for
access but chose not to, asserting it was longer and not as good a road. Nevertheless, nothing
prevented Plaintiffs from improving and utilizing the lower road in order to move construction of
their home forward. Additionally, with the exception of possibly one time, Plaintiffs or their
contractors were able to go around or remove the road barriers so as to reach their property. The
Defendants have not blocked the roadway since being enjoined from doing so by the Count in
June 2009, yet construction of Plaintiffs' Waha home remains unfinished. The evidence does not
establish that the construction delays resulted from the actions taken by the Defendants prior to
June 2009.
Next, Plaintiffs contend they suffered lost wages when John Hoch had to take time away
from work to deal with issues raised by the dispute over road access. However, Plaintiffs
presented no evidence supporting the claim, such as the number of appointments cancelled as a
direct result of the road issues and the average income per appointment. Rather, Plaintiffs
simply offered the Court a speculative number of 1.5 days lost at a value of $1,500.00 per day.
The Court finds the claimed damages too speculative and without sufficient evidence to directly
relate the loss to road issues.
Plaintiffs also seek damages for the cost of rock placed on the upper road and snow
removal costs for the upper and the lower road. The law in Idaho regarding the duty to maintain
an easement road is well established.
The owner of a servient estate has no duty to maintain the easement. Gibbens v.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 640, 570 P.2d 870, 877 (1977); Coulsen v. AberdeenSpringfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 630, 277 P. 542, 546 (1929). The duty of
maintaining the easement rests with the easement owner (i.e., dominant estate),
16
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even when the servient landowner uses the easement. Sellers v. Powell, 120 Idaho
250, 251, 815 P.2d 448, 449 (1991). That duty requires the easement owner
maintain, repair, and protect the easement so as not to create an additional burden
on the servient estate or an interference that would damage the land, such as
flooding of the servient estate. Conley, 133 Idaho at 271, 985 P.2d at 1133;
Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 640, 570 P.2d at 877; Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir
District# 2, 97 Idaho 634, 636, 550 P.2d 137, 139 (1976); Pioneer Irr. Dist. v.
Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 738, 285 P. 474, 475 (1930).
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455-456, 95 P.3d 69 (2004).
Costs incurred by Plaintiffs to clear snow, repair, and maintain roads on which they hold
easements rights are the responsibility of Plaintiffs, not the responsibility of the servient
landowners.
(G) DEFENDANTS SWEET COUNTERCLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Defendants Sweet, who hold an easement right in the upper road, have made substantial
improvements to the road from the point it enters the Sweet property to where it accesses their
home. Defendants Sweet now argue that if Plaintiffs Hoch are found to have an easement right
on the upper road, they will be unjustly enriched by the improvements made by the Sweets at
their expense on the portion of the road that traverses the Sweet property. Defendants Sweet
correctly note that Plaintiffs Hoch will benefit from the improvements made by the Sweets.
However, the law does not support Defendants claim for unjust enrichment.
When a servient estate owner seeks contribution they must show the dominant
estate owner's maintenance created an additional burden or an interference that
would damage the servient estate. Id.
[A]bsent a showing that the easement owners maintenance' of the
easement created an additional burden or interference with the servient
estate, the servient estate cannot dictate the standard by which the
easement should be maintained, expend funds to maintain it to the level
desired by the servient estate and then seek reimbursement for those
expenditures and contribution for future expenditures from the easement
owners.
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66, 190 P.3d 876 (2008).
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Defendants Sweet presented the Court with no evidence showing the improvements they
made to the upper road were the result of Plaintiffs' easement right creating an additional burden
or an interference that would damage the servient estate. Nor is it likely Defendants Sweet could
have made such a showing as the improvements they made to the road were done prior to the
Court ruling Plaintiffs Hoch hold an easement right in the upper road.
(H) BREACH OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Plaintiffs Hoch assert Defendants V ance 25 have breached certain of the covenants that are
part of each of the parties' warranty deeds by failing to maintain their property in a clean and
attractive manner and by acting in a manner that has been noxious, illegal or offensive so as to
interfere with Plaintiffs' quiet enjoyment of their property. The warranty deeds conveying
property to the V ances, Sweets and Hochs contain the following pertinent restrictive covenants:
1. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel,

nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners.
2. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner.
3. Outbuildings, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in
design to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel.

Plaintiffs contend Defendants Vance have violated the above portions of the restrictive
covenants by placing a brush pile and equipment on the Vance property within view of the Hoch
home and by failing to tear dovm an old shed that is visible from the Hoch property. Defendant
Vance testified the shed at issue was on the property when he purchased it, that the brush pile

25

Defendant Vances' claim is limited to any breach that occurred after the mediation agreement entered into by the
parties on July 2, 2010. See Judge Bradbury's Memorandum Decision and Order entered October 25, 2010.
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was the result of fire mitigation work being done in agreement with Nez Perce County 26 and that
he parks his equipment in the area as it is the only area on his property that is sufficiently flat for
such a purpose. Plaintiff Hoch in his testimony acknowledged the old shed was on the Vance
property prior to the Vances' purchase of the property and that the brush pile was burned once
weather conditions allowed. The Court does not find Defendants Vance in breach of the
restrictive covenants. Efforts to mitigate potential fire hazards are a benefit, not only to the
Vances, but also to those living in the area. The Court is also not persuaded that parking
equipment on one of the few flat areas of the Vances property violates the restrictive covenants,
nor does leaving a prior structure in place.
Finally, the Vances also assert a claim against Plaintiffs Hoch for violations of the
restrictive covenants by allowing litter and construction debris to accumulate on the Hoch
property. While the term "clean and attractive" as used in the restrictive covenants is vague, it is
also relative to the surrounding area. The Court cannot characterize the condition of the area
around the under-construction Hoch home as clean and attractive. However, the unkempt but
presumably temporary condition appears to damage only the Hochs, as the debris is not visible
from the Vance home or from the majority of the Vance property, but is clearly visible to any
potential buyer viewing the Hoch property. Therefore, while the present condition around the
Hoch home appears to violate the "clean and attractive" language in the restrictive covenants,
there is no evidence the Vances have been damaged by the condition.

26

Defendants Exhibit #204.
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Cl) ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Each party in his pleadings seeks an award of attorney fees and costs. The Court finds
each party shall be responsible for his own attorney fees and costs, as each of the parties asserted
meritorious claims and each prevailed in part.

ORDER
The route and scope of the upper road is as the roadway currently exists from the point
that it departs Stagecoach Road to the point that it reaches the Hoch property.
The warranty deed from Cridlebaugh to Hochs conveyed an easement right on that
portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property, but is limited to that portion of the
roadway and does not extend beyond the Vance property onto that portion that traverses the
Mc Kenna property.
Defendants Sweet's request for a declaratory judgment allowing them to move that
portion of the upper road that traverses their property is denied.
Plaintiffs' claims for trespass against Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are
dismissed.
Plaintiffs are ordered to remove the excavation rock that was taken from Plaintiffs'
property and deposited upon Defendants Sweet's property if they can obtain the cooperation of
Defendants Sweet.
Plaintiffs are ordered to remove the construction and other debris that has traveled from
Plaintiffs' property onto Defendants Vance's property if they can obtain the cooperation of
Defendants Vance.
Plaintiffs' claim for assault against Defendants Sweets is hereby dismissed.
20
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Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are hereby permanently enjoined from
preventing, or attempting to prevent, Plaintiffs exercise of their easement rights upon the upper
road and upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property.
Defendants Sweet's counterclaim for unjust enrichment is hereby dismissed.
Plaintiffs claim for breach of covenants against Defendants Vance is hereby dismissed.
Defendants Vance are hereby ordered to remove their lis pendens filing against Plaintiffs
Roch's property.
Defendants Vance's claim against Plaintiffs for breach of covenants is hereby dismissed.
Each parties' claim for attorney fees and costs is hereby denied.

Dated this -+--,
°'7
_-
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day of February 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, )
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY )
VANCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants/Appellants.
)

Case No. CV 2008-02272
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: L
Fee Amount: $101.00

17
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D.
HOCH, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, THEADORE 0.
CREASON, 1219 Idaho Street, P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, Idaho 83501;

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

19
20
21

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

22

_,,

1.

The above-named Appellants, ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and

23
24
25

wife, appeal against the above-named Respondents, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH,
husband and wife, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order entered

26
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

U,W OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

II._

1

2
3

in the above entitled action on December 23, 2009, by the Honorable John Bradbury, and the
Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order entered in the above entitled action on February 9,
2012, by the Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brodie, presiding.

4

2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or

5

6
7

8

9

orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l)
I.AR.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert

in the appeal include the following:

10

(a)

Did the District Court error in granting Respondents' motion for summary
judgment?

(b)

Did the District Court error in determining that "Buckboard Lane" was an
"existing roadway" at the time Jack Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to the
Appellants?

( c)

Did the District Court error in denying Appellants' motion in limine?

(d)

Did the District Court error in admitting Jack Cridlebaugh's deposition into
evidence?

11

12
13

14
15

16
17
4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript
as defined in Rule 25( c) I.AR. of the trial held on December 12, 13, and 14,
2011 in both l).ard copy and electronic format.
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19

20
21
22

23

6.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:

24
Document

25
26

10/21/2009
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plf s Motion for Summary Judgment
2

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

JI ,
lj'

1

10/2 l /2009

Memorandum in Support of Plf s Motion for Summary Judgment

2

11/19/2009

Affidavit of Jake Sweet

11/19/2009

Defs Jake and Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plfs Motion for
Summary Judgment

11/23/2009

Def s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

11/23/2009

Affidavit of Becky Vance in Support of Memo in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

l l /25/2009

Plfs Motion to Exclude Objectionable Testimony Submitted by the Affidavits
of Jake Sweet and Becky Vance

11/25/2009

Plfs Reply to Defs Jake and Autrey Sweet's Reply Memo to Plfs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Defs' Vance's Memo in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

12/14/2011

Exhibit 109, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing

12/14/2011

Exhibit 108, Deposition of Jack Cridlebaugh

3

4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
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7.

The Appellants request the following documents, charges, or pictures offered or

15
16

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted into

17

evidence.

18

8.

19

I certify:
(a)

20

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:

21

Name and Address:

22

Linda Carlton
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

23
24

25
26

(b)
NOTICE OF APPEAL

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript.
3

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

2

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

3
4

5

DATED this

6

JCJfid;; of March, 2012.
CLARK and FEE1\TEY

7

8

By:
.
W. Jeremy C : a member of the firm.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Rob and Becky Vance
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
of March, 2012, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following:

14
15
16
17
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19
20

Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Mcintosh
1219 Idaho Street
·
PO Drawer 83 5
Lewiston, ID 83501
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
PO Box 321
322 Main St.
Lewiston, ID 83501

0 /U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
0
Overnight Mail
0
Telecopy

u:;:r'

[]~U.S. Mail

C9'
0
0

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

21
22
23

0

Linda Carlton
Court Reporter
PO Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501

24

.--IJ.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

W
0
0
,,,

,/"/

/

25

_.,,:::.=-------:::;:~-.,

By:
/':: W. Jeremy Cart:'Attomeys for
Rob and Becky Vance
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE
ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV08-02272

FINAL JUDGMENT

The above matter came before the Court for trial on December 12, 13, and 14, 2011.
Plaintiffs Hoch were represented by attorneys Theodore 0. Creason and Samuel T. Creason.
Defendants Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were
represented by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order on February 9, 2012.
Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce
County, to-wit: The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Hoch v. Sweet & Vance
Final Judgment

---

- - - - -

--~-----------·------------~----

Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce
County, to-wit: The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
Defendants Jake and Audrey Sweet are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce
County, to-wit: The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
Defendants Rob and Becky Vance are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce
County, to-wit: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records ofNez Perce County,
Idaho.
THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT:

(1)

The route and scope of the road commonly referred to as the 'upper road' is
as the roadway currently exists from the point that it departs Stagecoach
Road to the point that it reaches the Hoch property.

(2)

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, by way of the warranty deed
from Criddlebaugh to Hoch, hold an easement for ingress and egress over
the road commonly known as the 'upper road', which crosses over a portion
of the real property owned by Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet and
a portion of the real property owned by Rob Vance and Becky Vance.

(3)

Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, by way of the warranty deed
from Criddlebaugh to Hoch, hold an easement over a portion of Buckboard

2
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Lane, the easement being only upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that
traverses the real property owned by Rob Vance and Becky Vance.
(4)

Defendant Sweets' request for a declaratory judgment allowing them to
move that portion of the upper road that traverses their property is denied.

(5)

Plaintiffs' claims for trespass against Defendants Sweet and Defendants
Vance are dismissed.

(6)

Plaintiffs Hoch are ordered to remove the excavation rock that was taken
from Plaintiffs' property and deposited upon Defendants Sweet's property if
they can obtain the cooperation of Defendants Sweet.

(7)

Plaintiffs Hoch are ordered to remove the construction and other debris that
has traveled from Plaintiffs' property onto Defendants Vance's property if
they can obtain the cooperation of Defendants Vance.

(8)

Plaintiffs' claim for assault against Defendants Sweets is hereby dismissed.

(9)

Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are hereby permanently enjoined
from preventing, or attempting to prevent, Plaintiffs exercise of their
easement rights upon the upper road and upon that portion of Buckboard
Lane that traverses the Vance property.

(10) Defendants Sweet's counterclaim for unjust enrichment is hereby dismissed.
(11) Plaintiffs claim for breach of covenants against Defendants Vance is hereby
dismissed.
(12) Defendants Vance are hereby ordered to remove their lis pendens filing
against Plaintiffs Roch's property.

3
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(13) Defendants Vance's claim against Plaintiffs for breach of covenants is
hereby dismissed.
(14) The claim for attorney fees and costs sought by each and every party is
hereby denied.

Dated this-+- day of July 2012.

4
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CERTIFICATE OF :MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was:

/hand delivered via court basket, or

~O ~UL

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2012, to:

-&-'

9 day of July

Theodore 0. Creason
Samuel T. Creason
PO Drawer 83 5
Lewiston, ID 83501
Edwin L. Litteneker
PO Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501
W. Jeremy Carr
PO Drawer 285

Hoch v. Sweet & Vance
Final Judgment

5

~15

1

2
3
4
5

6

W. JEREMY CARR
CLARK and FEENEY
Idaho State Bar# 6827
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Attorn~ys for Defendants/Appellants,
Rob a11d Becky Vance
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, )
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY )
VANCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants/Appellants.
)

Case No. CV 2008-02272

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: L
Fee Amount: $101.00

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D.
HOCH, HUSBAl'JD AND \\11FE, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, THEADORE 0.
CREASON, 1219 Idaho Street, P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, Idaho 83501;

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

18

19
20

21

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

22

1.

23

24

The above-named Appellants, ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and

wife, appeal against the above-named Respondents, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH,
husband and wife, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order entered

25

in the above entitled action on December 23, 2009, by the Honorable John Bradbury, and the
26
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1

2

Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order entered in the above entitled action on February 9,
2012, by the Honorable Judge JeffM. Brudie, presiding, and the Final Judgment entered on July 9,

3

2012, by the Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brudie.
4
2.
5

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or

6

orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l)

7

I.AR.

8

9

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert
in the appeal include the following:

10

(a)

Did the District Court error in granting Respondents' motion for summary
judgment?

(b)

Did the District Court error in determining that "Buckboard Lane" was an
"existing roadway" at the time Jack Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to the
Appellants?

(c)

Did the District Court error in denying Appellants' motion in limine?

(d)

Did the District Court error in admitting Jack Cridlebaugh's deposition into
evidence?

11

12
13
14
15
16

17
4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

18

19

A reporter's transcript has been requested and the estimated fee has been
paid.

20
21

(b)

22

The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript
as defined in Rule 25( c) I.AR. of the trial held on December 12, 13, and 14,
2011 in both hard copy and electronic format.

23

6.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record

24
25

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:

26
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1

2

Date

Document

10/21/2009

Plf's Motion for Summary Judgment

10/21/2009

Memorandum in Support of Plf's Motion for Summary Judgment

11119/2009

Affidavit of Jake Sweet

11/19/2009

Defs Jake arrd Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plf's Motion for
Summary Judgment

11123/2009

Def's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

11/23/2009

Affidavit of Becky Vance in Support of Memo in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

1 l /25/2009

Plf s Motion to Exclude Objectionable Testimony Submitted by the Affidavits
of Jake Sweet and Becky Vance

11/25/2009

Plfs Reply to Def's Jake and Autrey Sweet's Reply Memo to Plfs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Defs' Vance's Memo in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

12/14/2011

Exhibit 109, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing

16

12/14/2011

Exhibit 108, Deposition of Jack Cridlebaugh

17

7.

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

18
19

The Appellants request the following documents, charges, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted into

evidence.

20

8.

I certify:

21
22

(a)

23

24

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Name and Address:
Linda Carlton
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

25
26
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1

2
3

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript.

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

4

5
6

7

DATED this,Jlffrctay of
8

J~ly, 2012.
CLARKan~FE~

9

By:V~

10

w. Jeremy c~l,"a member clf'the firm.

11

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
_ Rob and Becky Vance

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20

v-·

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisJsftcray of July, 2012, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following:
Theodore 0. Creason
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Mcintosh
PO Drawer 835
Lewiston, ID 83501

~' U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

D
D
D

-- U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney at Law
PO Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501

D
D

Linda Carlton
Court Reporter
PO Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501

yu.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
D
Overnight Mail
D
Telecopy

~

21
22
23
24

1J-

25
'

26
NOTICE OF APPEAL

By:
/
W. Jeremy Carr, Attorneys f0/(
Rob and Becky Vance
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.

SUPREME COURT NO. 39788
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE,
Husband and wife,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Defendants-Appellants,
And
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
Husband and wife,
Defendants.

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
Nez Perce County, do hereby certify that the following is the
list of the exhibits offered or admitted and which have been
lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the Court this

/;J.-

day of September 2012.
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

By
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Date: 9/12/2012

Second

User: DEANNA

ial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 09:14 AM

Exhibit Summary
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number

Number
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Description

Result

Storage Location
Property Item Number

Defendants Sweet Exhibit A -Photograph--showing berm across
road (photo taken 11-13-08)
Admitted: 6-22-10
Defendants Sweet Exhibit B -Photograph -- showing machinery
blocking road (photo taken 9-6-08)
-- Admitted: 6-22-1 O
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1 -- Large arial
Photograph submitted as an
illustrative Exhibit at the
otsc/contempt hearing in front of
Judge Bradbury on 6-22-1 O -Admitted again at Court Trial:
12-12-11
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #2 -- Arial
photograph showing properties
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3-- Arial
Photograph showing Hoch, Sweet,
Vance, McKenna & Cridlebaugh
properties "2009" -- Admitted:
12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #4 -- Arial
Photograph showing Hoch, Sweet,
Vance, McKenna & Cridlebaugh
properties "2007" Admitted:
12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #4A -- (A copy of
Plaintiffs' exhibit #4 that Mr. Hoch
used a yellow highlighter on the
stand to depict where the shot
rock was placed) Admitted:
12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5-- Arial
Photograph of area with houses
and roads depicted "2007"
Admitted: 12-12-11
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5A --(A copy of
Plaintiffs' exhibit #5--Mr.
Litteneker drew on impovement
lines on roads during witness Mr.
Flowers' testimony) Admitted:
12-13-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #6 -- Arial photo
area (Sweet House is there, Hoch
and Vance houses have not been
built yet) "2004" Admitted:
12-12-11 Court Trial

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Destroy
Notification
Date

Destroy or
Return Date
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Date: 9.112/2012
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Description

Result

Property Item Number

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #6-A --(A copy of
Plaintiffs exhibit #6 that Mr.
Flowers drew on access roads
and exhibit 24 road and exhibit 25
road while a witness on the stand)
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #7 -- Arial
photograph of area before any
houses were built "1998"
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs; Exhibit #8 -Topographical Map of Area
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #9 -Topographical Map of Area
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #10 -- Nez Perce
County Idaho 2004 Rural Street
Atals
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #10-1 -Township Map of Area with Street
Names
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #11 -Photograph showing
Cridlebaugh/Hoch road sign
Admitted: 12-12-11
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #12 -Photograph showing close-up
view of Cridlebaugh/Hoch road sig1
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #13 -Photograph of road looking SW
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Offered

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #14 -Photograph facing East -Bulldozer on Section of Property
between Hoch/Sweet property
Admitted: 12-12-11
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #15 -Photograph showing position of
bulldozer near Sweet's property.
Photographer facing South
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #16 -Photograph showing white
pick-up, trailer and bulldozer in roa
Admitted: 12-12-11

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0
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Destroy
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Date

Destroy or
Return Date
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number
23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

Description

Result

Property Item Number

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #17 -Photograph showing newly
surveyed property line, berm and
red stake
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #18 -Photograph showing road near
Hoch's home
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #19-- Photograph
showing road near Hoch home.
Shows shed, pile of wood and
trailer
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #20 -Photograph showing road near
Hoch home looking west. Shows
trailer and wood piles
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #21 -Photograph showing showing
same scene as Plaintiffs' exhibit
#20 only a close-up view of trailer
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #22 -Photograph showing trailer and
small storage shed that was on
Cridlebaugh property and is now
on Vance property
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #23 -Photograph showing two pieces of
equipment (plow and trailer) in
closer detail
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #24 (a collective
exhibit including #24-1 - #24-10)
Photographs
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #25 (a collective
exhibit including #25-1 - #25-7)
Photographs
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #26 (a collective
exhibit including #26, #26-1 #26-44) Photographs showing
new road (trail)
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #27 -- Raymond
Neal Flowers P.E. Curriculum VitaE
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number
34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

Description

Result

Property Item Number

Plaintiffs' Exhibit #28 -- Report of
Raymond Neal Flowers, Civil
Engineer
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #29 -Photograph showing what Giese
encountered when came to work
at Hoch property. Dozer blocking
road
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #104 -- Purchase
Agreement (between Jack
Cridlebaugh and Rob Vance and
Becky Vance
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105 -- Warranty
Deed dated 10-12-00 Cridlebaugh
to Vance
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106 -- Warranty
Deed dated 10-10-01 Cridlebaugh
to Sweet
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107 -- Warranty
Deed dated 3-26-02 Cridlebaugh
to Hoch
Admitted: 12-12-11
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #108 -Designated Testimony, Deposition
of Jack Cridlebaugh Taken on
4-15-09
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #109 -- Sealed
Transcript of Motion to Show
Cause Hearing on 6-22-10
Honorable John Bradbury Presidin•
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial
Defendants' Vance Exhibit #200 -"1998" Arial Photograph
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Creason, Theodore 0

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Defendants' Vance Exhibit #200A
-- a copy of Defendants' exhibit
#200 where witness Mr. Vance
drew on exhibit designating lower
road in orange & East-West Road
in yellow at Court Trial
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #201 -"2004" Arial Photograph
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
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Destroy
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number

Number
45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

Description

Result

Storage Location
Property Item Number

Defendants Vance Exhibit #202 -"2007'' Arial Photograph
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Defendants Vance Exhibit #202-A
-- a copy of Defendants Vance
exhibit #202 where Mr. Vance
drew Buckboard Lane at Court
Trial
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #203 -Record of Survey Section 22,
Township 33 North, Range 4
West, Boise Meridian, Nez Perce
County, Idaho
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #204 -Survivable Space Plan -- Rob
Vance
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #205 -Photograph of Vance Property
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Defendants Vance Exhibit #206 -Series of (3) Photographs marked
A - C in lower right corner
Vance/Hoch property line
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #207 -Series of (4) photographs marked
A - D in lower right corner
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #208 D
& #208 G - L -- Photographs
showing construction debris on
Vance Property 2010
Admitted: 12-13-11 -- Court Trial
Defendants Vance Exhibit #209 -Series of (8) Photographs marked
A - H in lower right corner
Hoch property taken by Vance
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial
Defendants Sweet Exhibit #58 -Copy of Plaintiffs' exhibit #5 that
Mr. Sweet drew on during Court
trial
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial
Defendants Sweet Exhibit #305-A
- #305-H -- Series of Photographs
of Current Foute used by parties
(upper road) they show various
locations on upper road

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Carr, William Jeremy

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

P6iliiR\EfdFiQ;.MJ;'E1 CllOliifildlHBITS

Destroy
Notification
Date

Destroy or
Return Date

~~

Date: 9.'12/2012

Second

User: DEANNA

icial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 09: 14 AM

Exhibit Summary
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Case: CV-2008-0002272
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal.
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number
56

57

58

Description

Result

Property Item Number

Defendants Sweet Exhibit #310-A
- #310-W -- Photographs of
Proposed Route to be used by
parties
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial
Defendants Sweet Exhibit #313-A
-#313-F -Additional
Photographs of damages to
properties
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial
Defendants Sweet Exhibit #310-X
-- Photograph of Proposed route
to be used by parties -Admitted for demonstrative
purposes only: 12-14-11 Court
Trial

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Litteneker, Edwin L
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
SUPREME COURT NO. 39788
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE,
Husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

And
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
Husband and wife,
Defendants.

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings,
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of CrossAppeal, and additional documents that were requested.
I further certify

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

1. That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered
or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any,
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with
any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record as required
by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

/).

day of

September 2012.

PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk
By
Deputy Clerk

,.:..·'

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs Respondents,
v.
SUPREME COURT NO. 39788
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE,
Husband and wife,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Defendants-Appellants,
And
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET,
Husband and wife,
Defendants.

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript were delivered to W.
Jeremy Carr, 1229 Main St., Lewiston, ID 83501 and Theodore
Creason, 1219 Idaho St.,
Service, this

_!_l

day of

Lewis~::rrr_

Id 83501 by Valley Messenger

Se~er

2012.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

/1

the seal of the said Court this

day of

~~and

S~mber

affixed

2012.

PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

